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Nash: Negro Rights, Unionism, and Greatness on the South Carolina Court

NEGRO RIGHTS, UNIONISM, AND GREATNESS
ON THE SOUTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS:
THE EXTRAORDINARY CHIEF JUSTICE
JOHN BELTON O'NEALL

A. E. Km
I.

NASH*

INTRODUcTIOi

The prisoner has been severely whipped, - and even
if that was too small a punishment, do the humane
principles of the common law demand anything further? Sure am I they do not. If the prisoner was a
white man, and not a negro, could such a course receive
the countenance of anyonef ... I close now my duty
to this case, with the happy relief, that, if I have been
in error, it has been corrected by the better judgment
of my brethren,--and I am sure, I am more gratified by
the consciousness, that none of the blood of this negro
will rest upon me, than the prosecuting parties can be,
who will now be gratified by offering up his blood, as
a sacrifice on the altar of public justice.1
The year was 1851; the place, the South Carolina Court of
Appeals for the Correction of Errors in Law. With these words
John Belton O'Neall-for three and a half decades, from 1830
to 1863, the dominant member of the South Carolina appellate
court structure2-registered his pained dissent from his breth*Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa
Barbara. A.B., Harvard College, 1958. M.A., University of North Carolina,
1961. Ph.D., Harvard University, 1968.

1. State v. Nathan, 5 Rich. 219, 232-33 (S.C. 1851) (emphasis added).
2. I use this choice of words advisedly. In 1835 the state legislators, piqued

for reasons described below, dissolved the court of appeals which they had
created in 1824 and which consisted of three men unencumbered by circuit
duties exercising final jurisdiction in both law and equity. The legislators
restored the pre-1824 system of two separate conference appellate courts, one

in law and one in equity, each comprised by the several circuit judges and
chancellors assembling at Columbia and Charleston. A year later the legislators
created a kind of "troika" by providing that split-decisions on either conference
court could be appealed to a combined conference court. They thus created an
extraordinarily Byzantine structure which could result in one judge hearing a
case three times. He might decide a case one way on circuit, find himself
reversed on appeal to the conference court in equity, and then find himself
sustained by the combined appellate courtl In 1859 the legislature wisely

restored the 1824 structure, and officially recognized O'Neall's dominance by
creating for him the title of Chief Justice.
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ren's refusal to uphold a Negro's claim that he had been subjected to double jeopardy. The slave Nathan had been first
convicted and given one hundred lashes for simple assault and
battery. In a second trial he was sentenced to death for robbing
the female whom he had assaulted. O'Neall, at chambers,
granted a writ of prohibition on two grounds: one, that the
first conviction, coming upon an indictment for assault and
battery with intent to rape, negatived felonious intent and thus
made impossible a second felony trial; and two, that the facts
proved on the second trial did not amount to robbery. The State
appealed O'Neall's order successfully and two further trials
were held-the first resulting in a mistrial and the second in
a conviction. Nathan appealed again, but on this occasion he had
the misfortune to come before Judge David Wardlaws who,
though refusing to rule, delivered an obiter essay favoring the
State and sent the case straight up to the Combined Court. That
court upheld Wardlaw's view that the two offenses, attempt to
rape and robbery, could arise separately from the same action,
and moreover, that the facts did constitute robbery. Nathan
might well be getting a deal as existentially raw as his back
after his whipping, yet the state's prosecutory procedure did
not contravene the South Carolina Constitution.4
Wardlaw was, I think, technically correct. Yet the fact of
O'Neall's instant error-if it be that-should not dull us to the
salient importance of his opinion. That is, of course, contained
in the sentence I have italicized: "If the prisoner was a white
man and not a Negro, could such a course receive the countenanoe of anyone?" A statement like that, delivered even as a
dissent from the highest tribunal of the state which was to lead
the South out of the Union not ten years later, is, at a minimum,
intriguing. When-as I shall argue-such a statement is not
merely a momentary aberration but rather illustrates a major
thrust of a judicial career spanning a third of a century and
capped just two years before Fort Sumter by promotion to the
chief justiceship of the state, then we have grasped something
which bears extended scrutiny. Such scrutiny seems warranted
3. On the Law Court 1842-1859, and like O'Neall, a Unionist in 1860-1861.

4. It should perhaps be noted that no federal constitutional claims arose in
Nathan's case. Here-as in virtually all the Negro cases dealing with procedural rights-the state supreme courts were, prior to the passage of the
fourteenth amendment in 1868, final arbiters-a fact of "power" and "status"
which, I am sometimes tempted to think, may account in part for the generally
high quality of antebellum state decisions throughout the South.
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for at least three reasons. First, O'Neall's career does not square
with a major tenet of "Northern" historiography about the
climate of opinion and politics in the Old South. That perspective of the South-what we might call the Harriet Beecher
Stowe perspective, or if we chose to give it the greater dignity
of the major post-Civil War historian, James Ford Rhodes, the
Rhodesian interpretation-would be hard put to find a just
place for John Belton O'Neall and his court in an antebellum
scheme peopled solely by brutish slave-masters, fire-eating rednecks, and cringing Negroes. Nor would placement be substantially easier for contemporary "Neo-Rhodesian" views depicting the Old South as a gigantic concentration camp for
blacks exploited by capitalists in planters' clothing, themselves
driven unconsciously by the profit-spurs of laissez-faire economics. 5 Second, Southern "Revisionist" interpretations-those
which, beginning in the 1890's under Dunning at Columbia and
reaching an apogee in his pupil, U.B. Phillips of Georgia,
rather thoroughly revised "accepted" Northern views during the
first decades of this century--cannot easily do a great deal
better with the datum of O'Neall. If as Revisionists have urged,
Yankee abolitionism drove the previously "Jeffersonian-liberal"
seaboard South into a monolithic pro-slavery "concert of defense" during the early 1830's, why was O'Neall worrying in
1851 about not treating Negroes on trial as favorably as whites?
Third, there is a final reason for scrutiny-one that has contemporary practical, and not merely historical, interest. If
O'Neall's statement was not an isolated phenomenon but rather
characterized a persistent strand of concern for the Negro in
what was then-before the fourteenth amendment-a rather
potent "third branch" of South Carolina's government, how
shall we explain it other than by an analysis which would see
a good deal more diversity of racial outlook in South Carolina
history than either Rhodesian or Revisionist theories can
readily accommodate?
Discussing, in 1938, the shaping of the peculiar contours of
American law during the century after the Revolution, Roscoe
Pound suggested a list of "ten judges who must be ranked first
5. For examples of this "Neo-Rhodesian" trend see S. ELIINS, SLAVERY
(1959); J. FRANKI N, THE MILITANT SOUTH (1956).
6. For an extended discussion of various interpretations of the antebellum
South and the origins of the War Between the States, see T. PRESSLY,
AmE-ICANS INTERPRE THaE Civ WAR (1954).
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in American judicial history.7 This list by the late "dean" of
American legal scholars bore witness to the ample vitality of
the state judiciaries during the antebellum era. Six of the ten
judges made their imprint on American law from state benches.
Of these six, two-Spencer Roane of Virginia and Thomas
Ruffin of North Carolina-were Southerners. None came from
South Carolina or the Gulf States. To a substantial extent this
North-South imbalance was doubtless due to the importance of
a particular field of the law-commercial jurisprudence-whose
major development naturally came in regions involved earlier
than the Deep South in the industrial revolution. Yet if we
were to fix our attention upon the ancestry of a more problematic contemporary issue, race relations, which is still being
threshed out and whose threshing still creates havoc with intergovernmental balances of power, then we might well come up
with a different membership of such a "formative list" as
Pound's. Such a list might well begin with the elder John Marshall Harlan-the "great dissenter" of Plessy v. Ferguso70 and
the Civil Rights Cases9-and work back to a largely Southern
membership of antebellum slave state appellate judges. These
are men who, with a few exceptions, have been treated unkindly
by time. But given the contemporary patterns of consuming
racial conflict and urban cleavage, it seems hardly rash to urge
that these men, who first attempted to impose a solid rule of
law upon the American Negro's condition, merit attention. This
is not the place to enumerate the precise composition of such a
list and even less to explain particular choices. It is, however,
appropriate to assert that hardly anyone could come away from
a study of the not quite two hundred men who sat on these
antebellum southern appellate courts, and draw up such a list
excluding O'Neall. Why? Let me suggest one reason now-at
the risk of letting the analytical cat prematurely out of the
narrative bag.
John Maynard Keynes once somewhat naughtily contrasted
two of his major predecessors in economic theory by observing
7. R. Pouzw,

THE FORmATmW ERA OF AmICA-N LAW 4 (1938).
8. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Let me emphasize that the point here has nothing
to do with approving or disapproving of "separate but equal" as opposed to
"integration", or of the elder Harlan's reasoning. Granted the path which the
contemporary Warren Court has taken, the analytic issue is a question of the
ancestry of power, not of values.

9. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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that one1 ° chiselled in stone while the other-usually regarded
as the more important"!-knitted in wool. ONeall, it strikes
me, engaged in both activities. His dissent in Nathan was an
unsuccessful example of the latter judicial handicraft. On other
occasions-as in his loosening of South Carolina's restrictions
on emancipation of individual slaves during the 1830's-he
managed to knit a fabric which for several years kept the wool
over pro-slavery eyes. On still other, and rarer, occasions-as in
his onslaught against nullification-he chiselled an edifice out
of-if not granite-at least a fairly solid Carolina limestone
which the legislature could only remove by dissolving the court.
II. THE UNION AND THE SOUTH CAOLINA COURT or APPEALs
During the six years between the creation of the three-man
court of appeals in 1824 and O'Neall's appointment to it in
1830, its judges began to hew out a view of the Federal Union
which was to place it-once O'Neall was ensconced-in radical
opposition to the tide of nullification mounting in the state's
legislative and executive branches. While the notes of union
sounded by judges David Johnson and Abraham Nott during
the 1820's were softer than those to be trumpeted by O'Neall
after 1830, they deserve examination-both as prelude and because, where they have not been overlooked, they have been
susceptible to misinterpretation. Charles Warren has not stood
alone in his view of their refusal to follow the declaration of
their former colleague, William Johnson, 12 that the South Carolina laws forbidding Negro sailors to enter the State were unconstitutional. Warren's view that they thus displayed a provincial
and willful disregard for the Constitution and simply typified
South Carolina's retrograde outlook on the world has been
widely shared.' 3 Yet it is unfair to the South Carolina judges
in two ways.
10. W.S. Jevons.
11. Alfred Marshall.
12. Jefferson's first appointment to the Marshall Court, William Johnson,
had served prior to 1804 on the pre-1824 "conference-style" appellate court to
which Nott and David Johnson had previously belonged.
13. See 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME CouRT IN UNmTED STATES HIsToRY
624-27 (rev. ed. 1926) [hereinafter cited as WARREN] and 2 WARREN 168-71.
Particularly, "[tihe officials and Courts of South Carolina continued for
over twenty-five years to disregard Judge Johnson's opinion . .. ." 1 WARREN
627. And see his striking expression of what I would call a Neo-Rhodesian
summary of Southern reaction to Johnson, and to Gibbons v. Ogden: "So the
long-continued controversy as to whether Congress had exclusive or concurrent
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First, William Johnson gave his opinion in a case which
turned on a narrower question."4 Elkison v. DeZiesseline' 5 was
an application for a writ of habeas corpus, or alternatively for
a writ de homine replegiando,to release a British colored sailor
arrested by the sheriff of Charleston District on his arrival
aboard a Liverpool ship. Johnson was "decidedly of the
opinion' u 6 that the provision of the 1822 statute under which
the sheriff had acted '1 contravened the commerce clause. Yet
he found that he could not grant either relief prayed for: habeas
corpus, because the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 did not
authorize its issuance when a prisoner was in state custody; and
de homine replegiando, because it did not lie against a sheriff.
Consequently, Johnson's assertion of unconstitutionality was
obiter dictum. And it was dictum in a circuit decision-the
United States Supreme Court never heard the case. Consequently, there was no reason why the South Carolina judges
should have felt themselves bound by it.
Second, pre-1830 opinions do not suggest that the South Carolina judges were anxious to underwrite the Colored Seaman
Acts. Indeed, their handling of the two cases 5 arising before
that date indicates precisely the opposite. The South Carolina
court did its best to nullify convictions without reaching the
constitutional merits.
In Calder v. Deliesseline9 a British merchant living in
Charleston who was the consignee of a Nassau sloop had been
forced to pay detention fees for the sloop's first mate, a free
man of color, and four slave members of her crew before she
was allowed to sail. 20 He then sued Sheriff Deliesseline to
recover the money on the ground that all British subjects were
protected by treaty from seizure. Losing in the lower court, he
jurisdiction over commerce was not a conflict between theories of government,
or between Nationalism and State-Rights, or between differing legal construction of the Constitution, but was simply the naked issue of State or Federal
control over slavery." Id. at 627-28.
14. A point which Warren omits.

15. 8 F. Cas. 493 (No. 4366) (C.C.S.C. 1823).
16. Id. at 496.

17. 7 S.C. Stat. 461 (1822).
18. State v. Shaw, 4 McCord 480 (S.C. 1828); Calder v. Deliesseline, 1
Harper 186 (S.C. 1824).

19. 1 Harper 186 (S.C. 1824).

20. The arrest of the sailors had not been made until the ship was getting
clearance for leaving. This explains why there was no attempt to procure

habeas corpus from the state courts. It would have taken more time than
simply paying the fees and contesting later.
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appealed. The constitutional court in a brief opinion by Justice
Gantt unanimously awarded a new trial, noting that the Act
did not apply to slaves and ignoring the circumstances that the
mate, as a free man, could have been prosecuted under it.
The court of appeals used much the same technique four years
later to void the conviction of a New Hampshire captain who
had brought a free Negro cook on his ship into Charleston.
Captain Shaw had been tried in the city court of Charleston.
This would not do, the court said, for the cook had been arrested
while the ship lay at anchor in Charleston harbor just outside
the city limits. The captain should have been brought before
the Charleston district court. Here the court of appeals was
displaying a fine appreciation for procedural niceties-an
appreciation which its members had not displayed on other
occasions when the result would have thrust differently.
Indeed, the judges seemed to feel called upon to justify themselves. To be sure, they observed, such rigid adherence to form
could be productive of much inconvenience. But even if they had
the power to overlook the jurisdictional question, they "would
not be inclined to do so in a case in which all the reasons of the
general rule would apply."21 What were the reasons? Essentially just one: The common law insists on trial where the
offence is committed because of the "supposed facilities which
a Jury of the vicinage have in investigating the truth of the
facts." It might be argued, the court continued, virtually contradicting itself, that the rule did not apply in all its force to
Shaw's case. Of course it did not. A jury selected solely from
the city of Charleston was not going to find it any harder than
one from the slightly larger district of Charleston, to determine
whether or not Shaw had brought a Negro cook into the harbor.
Nonetheless, asserted the court, it would not do to make an
exception today when tomorrow a sailor might be tried in Columbia for entering the state at Beaufort.
I find it tempting to conclude that in Calder and Shaw, far
from seeking to jettison the claims of Union, the judges were
doing their best to avoid both convictions and constitutional
issues. Many judges opposed to legislative sentiment have acted
similarly. Yet such limited dispositions are not always possible
and the day came, less than a year after SShaw, when they were
21. State v. Shaw, 4 McCord 480, 482 (S.C. 1828). Contrast the lesser con-

cern for procedural fastidiousness in the cases discussed, infra, at notes 107

and 115.
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forced to face a conflict between federal and state laws. Ironically, it was William Johnson who forced them to the wall-not
by a judicial decision on the Seamen's Acts, but by a personal
action which undercut another "safeguard" law, a South Carolina statute of 1819 requiring all slaveholders to perform patrol
duty. William Johnson refused to be a patroller or to hire a
substitute-as the law allowed in instances of personal inconvenience. It certainly would be inconvenient for Justice Johnson
to gallop around the back country of South Carolina at night
when he was supposed to be deciding cases in Washington. In
his view he should be excused from patrolling under a Congressional Act of 1792, which exempted all federal officers from
militia duty. But the officers of the Charleston Neck Rangers
thought otherwise and summoned a court-martial which fined
the justice $100. He then applied to his old friend, Judge Elihu
Bay,22 for a writ to prohibit the officers from collecting the
fine.
The venerable Bay agreed with John Gadsden, the United
States District Attorney arguing Johnson's case,23 that there
were essentially two questions at stake. First, was patrol duty a
form of militia duty? Second, if it were, did Congress have the
power to say who should not serve in the militia, either as a
consequence of its power of organizing the militia or as an incident of its power to employ public functionaries?
However, he did not agree with the affirmative answers which
Gadsden advocated. In the first place, Bay said, the patrol was
not really a part of the militia. Rather it was
a system of police, essential, under the institutions of
this State, for the protection of the lives and property
of the citizens; and... all who enjoyed that protection,
were bound to contribute to the burden which it im24
posed on the community.

Consequently, Bay asserted, the 1'792 Act did not extend as far
as Johnson wanted it to. In any event, he concluded, if it did,
the subject not being legitimately within the control of Congress, the Act was, so far, inoperative. 25 Nor did he think that
22. Bay had been a circuit judge on the pre-1824 court. He continued to sit

in Charleston but was relieved from riding circuit on account of his age (born
1754).
23. Brother of the diplomat who secured the Gadsden Purchase.
24. State ex rel. Johnson v. Martindale, 1 Bail 163, 164 (S.C. 1829).
25. Id. at 165.
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the general power of employment could be construed so broadly.
Associate Justice Johnson would have to pay up.
From this unfriendly verdict, William Johnson appealed to
the high court of South Carolina and the court split. David
Johnson penned a truly nationalistic opinion. Of course, he
stated, Congress could not as a general matter forbid citizens
from joining the militia any more than it could prevent a state
from calling on its militia to prevent invasion by a foreign
country. "These are rights which are inalienable, and without
which, civil liberty could not exist."2 6 However, when the law
imposes two mutually inconsistent duties, "the citizen is bound
to discharge that of superior obligation. 2 7' The real question
was which law created the superior obligation; and the answer
was obvious. What would happen if William Johnson had to
leave Washington whenever the captain of his patrol summoned
him?
Shall the car of State stand still ...

? Shall the

suitors in the Supreme Court pocket their briefs... ?
Certainly not.
Next to the paramount obligation which all mankind
owe to the Creator, moralists place our duty to our
common country; descending, by regular gradations,
through all the various divisions and subdivisions of
the departments of the government and society, to the
domestic circle. 28
With this leaf from Daniel Webster's book Judge Charles J.
Colcock was not happy. Here was Johnson sounding like a
Yankee only a few months after the passage of the Tariff of
Abominations; his expressions could not be in any manner helpful to the establishment of what Colcock considered the "right
doctrine," nullification. Admittedly, Colcock wrote, requiring
Supreme Court Justices to perform patrol duty was an inconvenience from which, perhaps, they ought to be exempted.
But I take it that is not the question. The true question
is whether the State has, or has not, a right to impose
this duty, however irksome and incompatible it may
be. 29
26. Id. at 167.

27. Id.

28. Id. at 168.

29. Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
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Concede such a power of exemption to the federal government
and all United States officers would be exempted. Quite apart
from the practical chaos which this could induce, there was a
more general and more important problem-the correct order
of allegiance to different branches of the government. David
Johnson's descent through regular gradations, according to
Colcock, was wrong.
[I] take a different view of the construction of our government, and the relative duties to each which devolve
on individuals. In descending the circles of duty, I
should say the first and nearest is the domestic duty;
that the general government has no right to interfere
in the domestic concerns of the States, except where
specifically authorized by the constitution; and that the
right to elect a Judge . . .does not give them exclusive
power over him as a citizen.80
Far from it, concluded Judge Colcock, cutting the federal government down to a very small size indeed-to the District of
Columbia:
Their exclusive jurisdiction over any portion of the citizens of the United States, as such, is confined to their
ten miles square.31
Not so, replied David Johnson. "[Ain object might be indirectly effected which... cannot be directly attained."3 2 And Abraham Nott agreed. By two votes to one, the South Carolina
Appeals Court of 1829 held tenaciously to a nationalist interpretation of the Federal Constitution. For Johnson and Nott the
Union was supreme over the states.
Shortly after Justice Johnson's case, Abraham Nott died and
Charles Colcock retired from the bench in order to stump the
state in opposition to the 1828 Tariff Act. One might well have
expected the legislature to turn the tables on David Johnson and
reduce his judicial nationalism to a minority of one by appointing two new judges with "safer" views. Yet, curiously, the
legislators virtually duplicated, in O'Neall and the ardently proslavery Chancellor, William Harper, Nott's and Colcock's respective views. The results of this duplication were two split
decisions in the 1830's which gravely irritated the nullifiers. In
30. Id. at 170-71.
31. Id. at 171 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 170.
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both decisions the Court majority's theme was the same-federal
supremacy-and it suffices to consider the first where the court
could more easily have ducked the issue.
The new oath of office set by the 1833 Nullification Convention required all state officers to swear as follows: "'I, A.B., do
solemnly swear .

.

. that I will be faithful, and true allegiance

bear, to the State of South Carolina.' "
A passivist court could have construed the oath as an innocuous recital not requiring the primacy of State over Union.
However, the judges decided to meet the matter head on. In
both State ex TeZ. M'Cready v. Hunt34 and State ew rel. M'DanieZ
v. McMeekin3 5 mandamus was sought by individuals whose state
militia commissions had been withheld for refusing to take the
oath. In M'Cready the trial judge-the by-now extremely venerable Bay-refused, while in M'DanieZ, Judge Richardson
granted mandamus. The arguments on both sides were impressive and must have gone on for many hours, for the reporter's
summaries exceed 100 pages-much of it taken up by the arguments of the defendants' counsel, that chief of South Carolina
fire-eaters, Robert Barnwell Rhett. Contending that a divided
sovereignty between State and federation would force divided
allegiance upon the citizen, a fate abstract, cruel, and impossible, Rhett argued that sole sovereignty lay in the State. Accordingly, there was nothing unconstitutional about the oath. It
merely asked for the minimum that any sovereign could, and
should, require-loyalty. Chancellor Harper agreed. The other
two judges, however, did not.
David Johnson's attack was the more limited. The oath collided with the 1*778 Constitution which dictated the correct form
of oaths for officeholders in the executive branch--simply
requiring them to carry out legitimate statutes passed by the
legislature. Since the 1833 convention had been called by the
legislature to consider nullification, in changing the 1778 form
the delegates had exceeded their allotted powers. However,
Johnson cautiously observed, a duly called constitutional convention could enact such an oath. Nothing in its wording inherently conflicted with the Federal Constitution. Nonetheless,
he added, Rhett and Harper were wrong in thinking that
33. State ex rel. M'Cready v. Hunt, 2 Hill 1, 3 (S.C. 1834).

34. Id. at 1.
35. Id.
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allegiance could not be divided; in simple point of fact, in the
United States it was. Johnson seemed to occupy a middle ground
-wiping out the oath, but handing a sugar-coated pill to the
nullifiers.
O'Neall's attack was on much higher ground. The first half
of his lengthy opinion was really an obiter dictum essay on the
nature of allegiance. O'Neall doubted strongly that allegiance
citizen and State. Nor did he at all appreciate Rhett's tracing
citizen and state. Nor did he at all appreciate Rhett's tracing
allegiance back to its feudal origin in England. The fact that
one could find this concept in the polity from which South
Carolina was created-the United Kingdom--did not mean that
it fitted today. After all, "[mIany a noble river may be traced
back to some marsh . . . ."3 O'Neall did not care, certainly, for
the marshy origins. He held to an almost classic nineteenth
century view of the "ancient Anglo-Saxon freedoms" tragically
lost in 1066. The Norman conquerors had imposed feudalism "at
the point of the sword," and compelled "the free spirit of the
Saxon to meditate in darkness at the sound of the curfew."3' 7
O'Neall asked: "Do we claim our notions of allegiance, in this
free country, as arising from this age of slavery?"3 18 He "would
as soon say that darkness was parent of light, because the latter
merges from the former."3 9 In any event, specific historical
cataclysms broke the feudal chains. In England, the revolutions
of the seventeenth century abrogated whatever historic claims
allegiance might have levied. As for the ex-colonies: "In the
rugged wilds and mountain fastnesses of America, the sturdy
republican wanderer, clothed in the skins won by his bow and
spear, drinking from the bubbling brook, and eating the bread
produced by the sweat of his brow, [had been pursued] by this
phantom of allegiance.1 40 The phantom had been slain at Yorktown. O~eall, indeed, rejected allegiance completely as a political concept "in the land of Washington and Franklin ...
[a]llegiance is ... an unfit garb to clothe the republican. It
is like putting on the statue of Washington the robe of the
Caesars." 4 1 What then defines the citizen's duty? "It is alle36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 211.
Id. at 212.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 214.
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giance in the dominion of the [a]utocrat of all Russias: it is
42
here constitutional obedience."
Having thus circumscribed American political obligation in
a fashion that would look libertarian today, O'Neall grudgingly
consented to use the term "allegiance" to describe the follies of
the loyalty oath's defenders. Then he made short shrift of
Rhett's argument about the abstract, cruel impossibility of
divided allegiance. Rather, it was Rhett who was indulging in
abstractions: the obvious empirical point was that allegianceor preferably "constitutional obedience -- was owed to both state
and Union in their respective constitutional spheres. And,
"[w]hether this be divided or'single allegiance, it is exactly our
condition in point of fact, and it is in vain, therefore, to assert
an abstraction against positive, certain, existing and real duties,
which we daily practice and perform." 48
Furthermore, there were six reasons-at least-why South
Carolinians owed "allegiance" to the Union. First, it was as
"clear as a sunbeam" 44 from the governor's oath in the 1778
Constitution and in subsequent legislative provisions of 1784,
1786, and 1788. Second, as another matter of empirical fact, for
forty years South Carolinians had never doubted it. Third, if
allegiance were not owed to the Union, then South Carolina
statutes on naturalization were senseless. They recognized the
congressionally required oath of allegiance taken by naturalized
citizens as sufficient to confer South Carolina citizenship.
Fourth, the residents of federal territories could hardly be said
to owe allegiance to the Union if citizens of states did not. Yet
to no other government could they owe it-and they must owe
allegiance-or, better, "constitutional obedience"-to some government. Pure nonsense would be the logically entailed result of
Rhett's argument-that allegiances changed whenever a state
citizen took up residence in a territory, and vice versa. Fifth,
the United States Constitution empowered the federal government ,to punish treason against it-and "[w]hoever heard of
treason being committed against any of the subordinate parts
of a government."4 5 Sixth, another clause of the Constitution
made it obvious that the federal Union was supreme over the
states; namely, the amendatory power of article V. By this
42. Id. at 220.
43. Id. at 215.

44. Id. at 217.
45. Id. at 221.
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power, three-fourths of the states could bring about a change
in the Constitution which most South Carolinians might greatly
dislike, 40 yet they would be legally bound by such a constitutionally-instituted amendment.
O'Neall had caustic words for those running around the state
declaring that the present Union was oppressive and that the
old Confederation of 1776-1789 had been a higher form of government. Of the Confederation he declared:
I had regarded it as settled, and given up nearly 50
years ago as a matter of history, that it was an imprac47
ticable government ....
To have this old horse dragged out in 1834 could only lead a
rational observer to conclude that "[wie must live in an age of
political wonders and miracles, if not of natural ones." 48
III.

THE FREEING OF SLAvEs-O'NEAIL

VERSUS THE LEGoIsnATuRE

Simultaneously to repudiating nullification, O'Neall-with
the able assistance of David Johnson-was carving out a libertarian policy toward bequests of freedom which hardly endeared
him to pro-slavery stalwarts.
Between 1830 and 1835 O'Neall and Johnson radically sapped
the 1820 Manumission Act. In Linam v. Johnson,49 trover of a
slave whom the plaintiff had permitted to buy his freedom was
denied. The issue at stake was much like one which had been
raised in an astonishing case some forty years earlier, ,Sally's
Guardian.0 Could a master be held to contract with his own
slave for the purchase of freedom ? In light of a central doctrine
of slavery jurisprudence that the slave, qua chattel, could not
own property but that all his "possessions" were at law the master's, it would seem very odd to hold that a slave who earned
extra money by "moon-lighting" could prevent his master from
changing his mind about the "deal." In light of section 36 of
the Act of 1740, which allowed such "moon-lighting" only on the
condition that the master received "the whole of the earnings
46. O'Neall does not say, but seems to imply, that it might be something
such as Emancipation.
47. State ex rel. M'Cready v. Hunt, 2 Hill 1, 219 (S.C. 1834).
48. Id. at 218.
49. 2 Bail. 137 (S.C. 1831).
50. 1 Bay 260 (S.C. 1792).
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of such slave", an attempt to hold the master would appear
doomed. Yet in Sally's Guardian, John Rutledge ruled against
the master.51 Here, in Linam, the master had the apparent
advantage that the 1820 law no longer left the larger issue of
freedom open to the extent of the 1740 statute: Bill Brock's
freedom clearly contravened the later enactment. In the hands
of the judges that advantage turned to water. Ignoring the point
that the contract was illegal, Justice Johnson observed that
while caption might have been possible, trover could not avail.
The defendant, Bill Brock's guardian, had acted only "with the
humane view of giving effect, as far as he could, to a contract
which the plaintiff had himself made, upon most ample consideration, and which he now seeks to avoid." 52 Two years later,
53 reached a similar result-allowing
0line v. CaldwelP
quasiemancipation. But, to reach this end the judges had to reverse
the apparent procedural rules of Linam. In (line they granted
trover to the slave's wife, a free mulatto who claimed to have
purchased him, and voided a prior caption by the former white
owner's heirs who argued that the sale contract contained a
secret clause of illegal emancipation. Generalizing from the
dictum of an earlier case 5 4-- that a manumission by will is not
executed until the executors actually effect it-the court ruled
that until a Negro slave was actually permitted to go at large,
no legally cognizable act had taken place. Thus, a contract
absolute on its face, but with a secret trust, to let the
negro go at large as a freeman, or with a view to future
emancipation, is no violation of the Act of 1820, and is
obligatory between the parties . . .55
By placing the point of legally cognizable freedom so late, the
South Carolina court was opening the gates to manumission in
two ways. First, it could now be argued that not a will itself,
but rather the executor's pursuit of its dictates, "effected" the
freedom. Thus, neither the State nor the residuary heirs could
prevent execution if the executor chose to liberate the slaves
51. As this was a circuit decision delivered while Rutledge was Chief Justice

of South Carolina (he was not confirmed to the United States Supreme Court
as a political punishment imposed by Alexander Hamilton for his qualms about
the Jay Treaty), there was no reason for the court of 1831 to consider it

binding.

52. Linam v. Johnson, 2 Bail. 137, 141 (S.C. 1831).

53. 1 Hill 423 (S.C. 1833).

54. Lenoir v. Sylvester, 1 Bail. 632 (S.C. 1830).

55. Cline v. Caldwell, 1 Hill 423 (S.C. 1833) (syllabus).
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out-of-state. Second, in regard to either a will or a conveyance
for a purely nominal sum, slaves could not be seized of land
without a convincing showing that they had been permitted to
go at large. And a court inclined to the general propositions of
/line might well require a very heavy proof indeed. In short,
Sylvester, Linam and Gline could be the spadework for undermining the prohibitory structure of the 1800 and 1820 Acts.
Two years later the three-man court in one of its last decisions
decisively opened the first of these gates-out-of-state manumission. An action was brought to void "as being contrary to
the policy and laws of this State,"5 6 an 1824 will directing the
executors to hire out certain slaves to raise money so they could
be sent "with the assistance of government . . .to St. Domingo

or to any part that they with government may
to be colonized,
57
choose.11

Quite apart from the central difficulty of apparent conflict
with the 1800 and 1820 statutes, this will contained three provisions which conservative pro-slavery judges could have easily
seized upon in order to void it. First, it required slaves to make
an election as to destination. Such a choice, it could readily be
argued, was legally impossible as long as the Negro remained
a chattel. Second, pro-slavery judges could consider the slaves
being hired out to earn their transportation money as an unlawful quasi-emancipation. Third, it conflicted with a quartercentury-old decision, Bynum v. Bostiek, 58 which held that a
grant of freedom taking effect after the master's death was void
under the act of 1800.
Oddly enough, Frazier v. Emecutors of Frazierwas first heard
on circuit by the author of Bynum, the redoubtable Chancellor
William Henry DeSaussure, the "Father" of South Carolina
equity jurisprudence.5 9 DeSaussure was a man with highly
cohesive conservative views and given to considerable worry
about the future of slavery from an early date. In the 1790's
he had opposed both eliminating property qualifications for
56. Frazier v. Executors of Frazier, 2 Hill Eq. 304, 306 (S.C. 1835).
57. Id. at 305.
58. 4 Desaus. Eq. 266 (S.C. 1812).
59. See 1 J.O'NEALL, BIOGRAPHICAL SxECHs OF TE BENCH AND BAR
OF SOUTH CAROLINA 243-52 (1859). O'Neall-highly charitable as always-

called him the "Kent" of South Carolina. Id. at 245. Benjamin Perry, the
Unionist Governor of South Carolina immediately after the War, described
him as the "Chesterfield" of South Carolina. 2 B. PERRY, RMImscENcEs OF
Punic MEN 59 (1889) [hereinafter cited as PERRY].
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voting and redistricting the state legislature in order to reduce
the imbalance then existing in favor of the coastal counties. His
opposition stemmed from an intriguing source-his belief that
redistricting and extending the franchise would enforce the
erroneous notion of equality which would in turn lead to instant
freeing of the slaves and the ruination of both white and black
races.6 0 DeSaussure's anxieties had not lessened by 1833. indeed
he found Frazier an apt occasion on which to deliver an alarmist
lecture on the state of the Union. The will clashed fatally with
clear legislative intent "to prevent the emancipation of the
slaves held in the State." 61 The law was "founded on deep policy, and was intended to prevent emancipation . . . as a great

political evil, dangerous to the institutions of the State, and
injurious to the property and interest of the citizens.1 62 Directing the executor "to do what the owner is prohibited from doing
cannot be permitted to defeat the prohibition. Such an easy
evasion would be making the statute a mere cobweb." 63 DeSaussure thought that the executors' counsel was fully aware of "the
frailty of the argument" 64 since he "had endeavoured to sustain
it by saying the executors might and were bound, as trustees, to
carry it into effect, by sending the slaves out of the State, and
there emancipating them .... 2,65 To DeSaussure this argument,

the very one employed by the court that same year in Cline,
was frivolous.
Finally, he saw no escape in the argument that the will requested the assistance of "government." DeSaussure bolstered
his position with alarm.
Besides, what government is meant? If the State government, that has no foreign relations with St. Domingo .... If the government of the United States be
meant, assuredly neither the State nor its authorities,
nor any of its citizens, would ever permit the interference

.

.. with that subject, on which the government

of the United States has no right to intermeddle, and
on which, if it made any attempts directly or indirectly,
a disruption of the bonds which bind and unite the
60. See F. GREN, CoNsTinuioNAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SouTr ATLANTIC

STATSs, 1776-1861 (1930).
61. Frazier v. Executors of Frazier, 2 Hill Eq. 304, 306 (S.C. 1835).
62. Id.

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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States, would necessarily take place. It is the noli me
tangere subject. 66
While the executors could still try to get a special act through
the legislature, in the meantime the will was an attempt to evade
the statute and thus merely null and void.
Two years later, on appeal, Judges O'Neall and Johnson proceeded to "make the statute a mere cobweb."0 7 Admitting the
consonance of DeSaussure's reading with the letter of the 1820
law, O'Neall asserted that it clashed with the law's spirit 6 s and
adduced an argument which seems to me as "frail" as it did to
several later South Carolina judges. 9 Asserting that the 1820
statute should be construed in the light of other relevant laws,
O'Neall found two which gave off singular rays. According to
O'Neall, the 1820 and 1823 Acts prohibiting the entry of free
Negroes showed that the legislature's intent had been only to
prevent an increase in domestic free Negroes. This might well
have been the case with these two laws; but that they justified
such a reading of the 1820 Manumission Act is notably less
manifest to me than it was to O'Neall.
Possibly aware that to this point DeSaussure's reading looked
more sound, O'Neall adduced another argument. The 1820 Act
could not have prevented owners from taking their slaves outof-state, and it "could not . . . have effect upon emancipation

beyond the limits of the State." 70 Unless a specific statutory
prohibition existed, an executor could be empowered by a testator to dispose of any property in the same ways that lay open
to the testator when still living. Therefore the executors could
remove the slaves. This was an argument with at least three
peculiarities.
First, it does not adequately distinguish-indeed it is tempting to believe that it deliberately confuses-two sorts of "out of
State" taking, lawful and unlawful. True enough it was that
[s]laves within her limits, when lawfully removed beyond them, ceased to be liable to her jurisdiction. They
then became liable to another jurisdiction, and were to
be held, enjoyed or disposed of, according to its laws. 7 1
66. Id. at 307.

67. Harper was either absent or dissented silently. See the reporter's note.
Id. at 318.
68. Id. at 314.
69. See note 132 infra.
70. Frazier v. Executors of Frazier, 2 Hill Eq. 304, 314-15 (S.C. 1835).
71. Id. at 315.
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But it is not obvious that the executors' proposed removal wa3
lawful. That was the point to be proved. What was the proof
that O'Neall offered-after coming perilously close to assuming
the answer? The principle of Cline that a South Carolinian
could not go out of state, capture Negroes under the authority
of the Act of 1800, bring them back, and hold them. But how is
this relevant to a situation in which the slaves had not yet been
removed?
Second, it collided head-on with DeSaussure's old 1812
opinion in Bynum. O'Neall emerged tactically triumphant from
the collision simply by overruling it. Yet, to do so, he had to
imply that DeSaussure was stupid or careless, to distort DeSaussure's position, and to ignore blithely a crucial part of the Act.
For O'Neall, DeSaussure's opinion
was certainly prepared under a strange misapprehension of the law, and without looking at the Act. For it
states that the "statute expressly forbids any emancipation in any other way than by deed executed in the lifetime of the master . . ." On looking at the Act, (2
Faust 355), it will be seen that there is not a word said
about the deed being executed "in the lifetime of the
master . . . ." This shews at once the unsoundness of
72
that decision.
While O'Neall's textual observations are correct, they do not,
I think, lead to his conclusion. On the contrary, what the Act
does say is that no emancipation shall be valid unless it conforms to the procedure laid down for the master of appearing
before a court and persuading it to issue a certificate, that any
person can capture a slave set free in another way, and that "no
part of this act shall be construed so as to . . .invalidate any

disposition by will of persons now deceased

. . .

.

"3

This last

clause seems crucial. DeSaussure must have believed that the
legislators included it because otherwise the law would have
voided wills pending settlement in 1800; and conversely that
they intended to void all such wills after that date. An alternative reading is barely possible-namely, that the legislature
intended to allow future wills directing the executor to apply
to court and prove good character. But this would require an
oddly-phrased will: "free my slaves if ... ." Since the legislators
72. Id.

73. 7 S.C. Stat. 443 (1800).
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were clearly cognizant of the problems posed by wills, almost
certainly they would have worded the final clause differently.
I take it that DeSaussure meant by "expressly," not that the
legislature used his very words, but simply that the statute, construed as a whole, indicated legislative restriction to lifetime
manumission. At the very least, O'Neall's failure to deal with
the final proviso of the Act is a more serious omission than
DeSaussure's. As Frazier stands, it simply falls short of persuading me that it, rather than Bynum, was the neutral decision.
Third, O'Neall's opinion is extraordinary for the high ground
to which it finally leaps. Even following O'Neall to the conclusion that an executor cannot be stopped by the state or the heirs
from carrying out a direction to remove and free, I am surprised
by the additional territory which O'Neall seizes. The first half
was necessary to freeing Frazier's slaves-namely, that O'Neall
declare inconsequential the word order of "liberation" and
"removal", for Frazierhad directed "liberation" then "removal."
But the other half-that the court could compel a reluctant
executor to carry such a bequest into execution-was wholly
unnecessary as the executors were already attempting to do so.
Frazier, in sum, looks extraordinarily like a deliberate opening
of an avenue to liberty which the legislature had intended
should remain shut.
It was just six months later that the legislature decided to
abolish the three-man court of appeals and restore the separate
Law and Equity Conference Courts. With a minimal show of
respect for judicial independence, O'Neall and Johnson were
not thrown out completely in the cold. O'Neall was assigned to
the law court, while Johnson and Harper were appointed to the
equity bench.

IV. O'NEAa, 1835-1842,

AND TMHE PROB E

O MOT=Vw

The Unionist libertarians thus dispersed, it would not have
been surprising had their handiwork been undone. Yet for the
next seven years the reverse was true. Not only was the path of
out-of-state freedom left untouched, but the alternate route of
in-state quasi-emancipation was widened.
In 1838 the law court upheld a bequest of slaves to one John
Dangerfield notwithstanding a condition explicit in the will:
[Flor this purpose only, that . . . Dangerfield ...
[does] permit and suffer the slaves . . . to apply and
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appropriate their time and labor to their own proper
use . . .without the intermeddling or interference of

any person... further than may be necessary for their
protection under the laws of this State . .. .7

The will also gave him the rest of the testator's estate on condition that the slaves be allowed to use it "without the interference
or meddling of the said Dangerfield, or any person . .

.,)5

Dangerfield argued that he had not yet actually freed the slaves,
notwithstanding testimony that during the first year of his
"possession," he had more or less let them do what they wanted
on a plantation half-a-mile from his own residence. The lower
court judge, A.P. Butler, charged the jury that the will was
"a palpable attempt to defeat and evade the laws of the State
against the emancipation of slaves"' 6 and that they were liable
to capture if it had been carried into effect. However, the jurors
found that the slaves were not yet free, and the law court, while
admitting that equity might yield the opposite result, refused to
disturb their verdict. Rhame indicated that, granted a willing
jury, quasi-emancipation could be substantial. The State could
77
not act.

Three years later the law court struck out in a newly expansive direction, and brought the disapproval of both the legislature and later judges down upon its head. Carmifle V. Carmule's Adminstr&ato0 8 involved an attempt by a white female
to void the quasi-emancipation of her mulatto half-brothers and
half-sisters. The father had deeded them to defendants Pringle
and Chartrand for a nominal consideration on the express condition that they be allowed to work for themselves and pay only
$1 per year to the defendants. Hearing the case on circuit,
Chancellor Benjamin Faneuil Dunkin delivered an opinion in
no way redolent of his Massachusetts family background, his
Philadelphia birth, or his Harvard education. 79 Dunkin thought
74. Rhame v. Ferguson, 1 Rice 196, 197 (S.C. 1839).
75. Id. at 198.
76. Id. at 201.
77. But, it could prosecute successfully a premature captor. See State v.

Singletary, 1 Dudley 220 (S.C. 1838). And compare the conservative equity
court which seventeen years later held the trust illegal. Ford v. Dangerfield,
8 Rich. Eq. 95 (S.C. 1856).
78. 2 McMul. 454 (S.C. 1842).

79. A "Faneuil" of Boston's Faneuil Hall, and a teetotalling Episcopalian.

See 1 Pmy 208-13. Perry entertained a very high view of his judicial abilities
despite their political differences, and thought the Reconstructionists mistaken
for removing him from the Chief Justiceship. He succeeded O'Neall in 1863.
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it "too clear to admit of argument, that the bill of sale . . .
[was] an undisguised attempt to evade the law ..
emancipation . . .,20

. forbidding

On appeal, the slaves hired one of the leading anti-nullifiers,
Thomas Grimke, as counsel. Feeding back Cli e to its progenitor, Grimke urged that the conveyance was not contrary to the
spirit of the law.
O'Neall gladly accepted his argument and reversed in a
fashion which, I believe, justifies the criticism later levelled by
Chancellor G. W. Dargan:
It is impossible to deny that this decision afforded a
precedent, and a form by which the Act of 1820 might
be practically annulled and the policy of the State
baffled. 81
In O'Neall's view the slaves were not free because "[tfhe hire
which they pay, however inconsiderable, is a constant recognition of servitude." 2 Yet if one dollar per year sufficed to show
slavery, how often could the judges find quasi-emancipation?
Furthermore, Linam had indicated that the proper means of
effecting the Act of 1820 was by caption. Frazier, drawing on
SyZveoter, deferred legal caption to a time such that no one could
stop willing trustees or executors from sending slaves out of
state to freedom. Rhame left the determination of in-state quasifreedom to the jury by refusing to reverse a finding of fact. Yet
here in an equity suit where there had been no jury and the
chancellor had found quasi-emancipation, the court was willing
to overrule. O'Neall's motives seem clear to me in one passage:
If it was so that a man dared not make provision to
make more comfortable faithful slaves, hard indeed
would be the condition of slavery. For then no motive
could be held out for good conduct; and the good and
the bad would stand alike. Such has never been the rule
applied to our slaves, and such I hope it never will be.8 3
This was perilously close to admitting that Carmille had made
not an outright gift with some "advice" which the administrators were (as they claimed) free to disregard, but rather an
illegal trust.
80. Carmille v. Carmille's Adm'r, 2 McMul. 454, 456 (S.C. 1842).
81. Morton's Heirs v. Thompson, 6 Rich. Eq. 370, 375 (S.C. 1854).

82. Carmille v. Carmille's Adm'r, 2 McMul. 454, 468 (S.C. 1842).
83. Id. at 470.
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There was an additional problem. In a second deed Carmille
had conveyed two other slaves, whom he apparently did not so
favor, to Pringle and Chartrand on the condition that they were
to labor to the use of the five beneficiary slaves until the youngest reached twenty-one. Then they were to be sold, and the
proceeds divided among the five. This second deed put O'Neall
in a difficult position. He began by suggesting that it would be
regarded as similar to the first deed, as a conveyance to Pringle
and Chartrand with some helpful and optional advice attached.
But this view ran afoul of an earlier case, Fable v. Brown. 84 In
Fable, Harper, with O'Neall concurring, determined that property so devised escheated to the state. Now O'Neall declared that
he had never agreed with Harper's reasoning but only in the
result, and turned back fifty years to Sally's case. Those two
cases, he urged, were the only instances denying the absolute
right of the owner, to property acquired by the slave. Sally, he
thought, went "further" than he would have gone in order to
deny "the right of the owner . . .to the acquisitions of a slave,

and sustain the freedom of a negro, purchased by a slave out of
her own earnings."8 5 But he approved its "ample authority to
prove ... a slave might acquire personal property, and that such
a thing as an escheat was not an incident of it."86

This, I submit, is Justice O'Neall carefully picking and
choosing in order to uphold Camnille's quasi-emancipation. He
selected just enough from Sally's doctrine to suit the purpose.
Anything else would be fatal. Less, and the defendants would
not have been able to keep the trust-under Fable it would have
escheated. More, and both the trust and the quasi-free status of
the slaves would be imperiled: it would be very difficult to
argue that the slaves held absolutely , la Sally's purchaser, and
not also to admit that they were enjoying a condition strangely
unlike slavery, and thus subject to distribution or caption.
O'Neall's position very neatly both thwarted Carmille's daughter in the immediate suit and minimized the possibility of later
capture. That this picking and choosing was deliberate is suggested by the circumstance that on the next occasion-six years
later-when O'Neall saw fit to rely on Sally, he would place
another gloss on it.87
84. 2 Hill Eq. 378 (S.C. 1835).

85. Carmille v. Carmille's Adm'r, 2 McMul. 454, 471 (S.C. 1842).

86. Id.
87. Vinyard v. Passalaigue, 2 Strob. 538 (S.C. 1848).
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Is this a fair interpretation of O'Neall's purpose? I think so
for two additional reasons.
First, by the time O'Neall wrote his opinion it was pellucidly
clear that the legislature did not consider the court's treatment
of the 1820 statute from Linam through Rhame correct. Between
the time of Carmille's referral from the Appellate Chancery
Court and its determination by the combined court of appeals
because of disagreement among the chancellors, the legislature
passed a new statute designed specifically to close down the
paths to freedom which the court had been opening up. s8 On
December 20, 1841, the legislature passed without a recorded
division 9 a law whose four sections can hardly be interpreted
as anything other than a direct slap at the O'Neall-dominated
court.
The first section voided any post-mortem bequest, deed of
trust, or conveyance "whereby the removal of any slave .. .
without the limits of the State, is secured, or intended with a
view to the emancipation of such a slave .

..."90

The second section voided lifetime deeds "accompanied by a
trust, secret, or expressed" 9 1 for removal and liberation.
The third section voided all bequests and conveyances with
either "secret or expressed" trusts for in-state "nominal servi92
tude.
The fourth section voided all gifts of property with attached
secret or express trusts that it be held "for the benefit of any
slave .... ))93
The third and fourth sections seem to me, as to Dargan, aimed
directly at Carmille. One could, I think, perceive it as a direction by the legislature to the court to uphold Dunkin's view of
Carmille. However, O'Neall, though doubtless unhappy with the
88. Dargan, in Morton's Heirs v. Thompson, 6 Rich. Eq. 370 (S.C. 1854),
states that "[t]he case of Carmille v. Carmille, and other cases occurring about
the same time, gave rise to the Act of 1841. This Act was intended . . , to
provide for cases which, according to judicial construction, were not embraced
in any previous legislation." Id. at 375. Dargan seems to imply, and other
historians have taken him to mean that O'Neall's Carmille opinion was primarily responsible for the Act. That is impossible since the Act was passed
before the opinion was delivered. More likely, the other cases-e.g., Rhane
and perhaps Farr v. Thompson, 1 Cheves 37 (S.C. 1839)-and perhaps the
split on the Equity Bench in Carmille, produced the law.
89. Neither the House nor the Senate journal contains any debates illuminating the reasons for passage.
90. Morton's Heirs v. Thompson, 6 Rich. Eq. 370, 375 (S.C. 1854).
91. rd.

92. Id. at 376.
93. Id.
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sudden dismantling of his libertarian edifice, found a way to
secure one final victory. Carmille's daughter might think that
the 1841 Act was designed to affect retrospectively all pending
wills, "but on carefully considering it," O'Neall determined:
"[A]ll its provisions are future, and I rejoice that they are so.
For I should have thought it a stain upon the purity of our legislation, if it had been true that an Act had passed to defeat vested
rights."94 Otherwise it would have been an unconstitutional
violation of due process of law. Of course, it only would have
violated due process under O'Neall's interpretation of the Act
of 1820, not under Dunkin's, nor under the legislature's-but
O'Neall did not point that out, and Carmille's slaves got by just
under the wire.
Whose "vested rights?" The phrase suggests another possible
motivation for O'Neall's--or his brethren's-debilitation of the
1820 Act than the one which we have implied up to nowhumanity. Certainly one should not neglect the possibility that
O'Neall was concerned not for the slave's vested right to freedom, but for the master's absolute property right to dispose of
his estate however he willed. Indeed, a later case suggests this.
In May, 1844, the court ruled unconstitutional an 1835 statute"5
providing for the forfeiture of slaves taken north of the Potomac by their masters and returned to South Carolina. 9 6 The
legislators might be anxious to prevent contamination of the
Negro mind by Yankee principles of abolition yet, the court
insisted, they could not take away property without due process
of law.
And, there is a further candidate for consideration as motive.
In Carmille O'Neall urged the merits of an alternate policy to
the severe repressiveness of the legislature:
Kindness to slaves, according to my judgment, is the
true policy of slave owners, and its spirit should go (as
it generally has) into the making of the law ....
Nothing will more assuredly defeat our institution of
slavery, than harsh legislation rigorously enforced. On
the other hand, as it hitherto has been, with all the protections of law and money around it, it has nothing to
fear from fanaticism abroad or examination at home.97
94. Carmille v. Carmille's Adm'r, 2 McMul. 454, 471 (S.C. 1842).
95. 7 S.C. Stat 472-73 (1835).
96. State v. Simons, 2 Speers 761 (S.C. 1844).

97. 2 McMul. 454, 470 (S.C. 1842).
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Perhaps O'Neall's activism proceeded mainly from the view that
the best hope of preserving slavery was to eliminate as many of
its brutalities as possible.
Without denying altogether the presence of either motivebut without flatly asserting it either-I would argue that
O'Neall's activities, both on and off the Bench, in the years after
1841, warrant three inferences about his attitudes which set him
measurably apart from the prototypic pro-slavery southerner.
The first inference is that, despite his feeling that white and
black were unequal castes, his curiously mixed bag of attitudes
contained a broad strand of humanity toward the Negro, qua
human. The second inference is that he was, at least unconsciously, troubled by the peculiar institution and cannot be
adequately described as an unusually devious opponent of abolition who advocated changing the institution solely in order to
preserve it. The third inference is that he did not become more
comfortable about slavery as its Northern enemies pressed their
case politically during the 1810's and 1850's.
Four types of evidence lead to these inferences: first, his behavior in criminal trials concerning Negroes; second, his continuing attempt to pull the court towards freedom in manumission suits; third, his strenuous efforts to find in favor of persons
claiming to be whites rather than free Negroes; and fourth, the
far-reaching reforms of the Negro Code which he urged in a
treatise written in 1848.
V. CI3InrNAL PROSECUTIONS APD TE NEGRO

In recent years angry words have been heard concerning the
attitudes of southern state appellate courts toward enforcing the
"law of the land." Some have argued vehemently that these
courts were a dead-end to those appealing for judicial action
to make the rule of law prevail over nocturnal vigilante administration of violence.9 8 Others have urged with equal vigor
that so to depict these benches is manifestly unfair.9 9 Without
entering this thicket of political value judgments, let me urge
this: Whatever may constitute the best paradigm of contemporary southern appellate decision-making, no paradigm can
fairly extrapolate behind the Civil War a pattern of general
98. See, e.g., Meltsner, Southern Appellate Courts: A Dead End, in SOUTHB-

ERN JusTIcE

136-154 (L.Friedman ed. 1965).

99. See, e.g., Symposium: Southern Justice, 37 Mss. L.J. 396 (1966).
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unreceptivity to the claims of Negroes for justice before the
law. If antebellum judges varied substantially among themselves
in dealing with suits for freedom, virtually all were seemingly
anxious to do their best to protect the antebellum Negro whether
he was on trial for criminal activity or whether a white was on
trial for unlawful injury to him.
Nowhere was this concern more fully displayed than on the
O'Neall court. The display is clearer if we perceive it in light of
a central historical fact.
By 1830 the statutory position of the slave was much less
fortunate in South Carolina than in some other slave states, for
instance, North Carolina. This was so for two reasons. First,
there had been no South Carolina equivalent to the North Carolina statutory provisions of 1793 and 1818 that the Negro should
enjoy the full panoply of trial rights as a white person accused
of a felony. Second, neither the South Carolina legislature nor
the pre-1830 court had decided that the slave was entitled to the
protection of the common law. During the first quarter of the
nineteenth century, the North Carolina court had diligently
worked to bring the slave under the cloak of the common law
by accepting the dubious analogy between medieval English
villeinage and American slavery. In South Carolina the slave
was-logically enough, if harshly so-only protected insofar as
the legislature had expressly cut away parts of the master's
absolute right to do what he willed to the slave qua captured
enemy alien. Granted, then, this inherently less favorable position, the South Carolina Negro fared uncommonly well when
he managed to get his case heard by the court of appeals. 100
We should begin by observing that any notion that South
Carolina courts did not concern themselves at all with attacks
by whites upon Negroes is erroneous. Between 1830 and 1860
the court of appeals heard seventeen appeals by whites convicted
for actions, ranging from inadequate provision of food to
slaves' 01 and unlawful assault upon a free Negro,'1 02 to murder.
100. This essay does not attempt to determine how frequently Negroes'

fates-as opposed to whites'-were "settled" by extra-judicial processes of
violence, or never proceeded beyond the local court level. However, two points
may be noted. First, a random sample of Southern Reports suggests that there
was no great imbalance between felonies appealed by whites and Negroes, and
the ratio of whites and Negroes among the population. Yet second, and
thrusting in the opposite direction, O'Neall's views as to the procedural
inequities of South Carolina's system of magistrates and freeholders courts
were surely sound.
101. State v. Bowen, 3 Strob. 573 (S.C. 1849).
102. State v. Harden, 2 Speers 152 n (S.C. 1832).
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The prosecutory system was hardly wholly inactive and presumably other prosecutions occurred which the defendants won
or failed to appeal. Further suggestive are the ratios of appeals
heard to appeals sustained in two fields: whites prosecuted for
attacks upon Negroes; and Negroes accused of crimes. Only
three of the seventeen whites received new trials. By contrast,
six of the nine Negro appellants were successful. John Belton
O'Neall, we should note, differed with his brethren in directions
we might suspect. O'Neall wished to convict one more white and
to award two more new trial to Negroes, than did the court
majority.
The essential neutrality of the majority's position in one case,
State v. Nathan, has already been discussed in the opening paragraphs of this essay. O'Neall's objection to executing a slave
after carrying out a prior trial's sentence of one hundred lashes
may have been generous but it was hardly required by law.
What then of the other two refusals to reverse? In State v.
Friiday0 3 the court declined to hear an appeal after a previous
application to the judge on circuit had failed. Here, even
O'Neall agreed, the law was clear: The court of appeals had no
power to overrule a circuit refusal. In Em parte Boylston1 0 4 a
master sought unsuccessfully to stay the whipping imposed upon
his slave for insolence to a white person by a court of magistrates and freeholders. The court record does not allow for easy
judgment of the merits of the master's complaint that the court
had exceeded its statutory discretion in trying such a case. The
court majority, rejecting his contention, asserted that both
dictum in an eighteenth century case and settled practice in local
courts allowed prosecutions for insolence. It further urged that
an intolerable situation would result if a white had no legal
redress. Holding that the magistrates' court had no such power,
would promote violent private redress by the aggrieved white
and cause a decline in respect for law. O'Neall, dissenting, stated
that he had never heard of such a case since he had entered the
bar, and that the outcome of clothing magistrates with such
power would be equally bad. "[N]o jurisdiction ever did exist,
which is liable to more abuse than that exercised by magistrates
over slaves .... [T]he result will be that passion [and] prejudice,
103. 4 Rich. 291 (S.C. 1851).
104. 2 Strob. 41 (S.C. 1847).
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and ignorance will crowd abuses on this inferior jurisdiction to
an extent not to be tolerated by slave owners."' 0 5
Be the respective insights in Boylston as they may, any doubts
engendered must, I suspect, be laid to rest when placed against
the successful appeals by Negroes. The judges were perfectly
willing to grant another claim of double jeopardy when they
were convinced of its validity.10 6 So too, they were willing to
make a dubious expansion in procedure to prevent the execution
of a Negro sentenced to death for burglary.
In State v. Ridgell'0 7 the slave had been so sentenced despite
proof that no one had been sleeping in the building from which
he had stolen. Prior to Ridgell, writs of prohibition had been
granted only when the appellant could show that the lower court
had acted beyond its jurisdiction. But here there was no other
means of barring execution.' 08 The case was too revolting not
to expand the writ's usage. This theme of expansion in order to
secure substantive justice appears to have generally pervaded
the court, and the attitudes expressed in State ex rel. Matthews
v,. Toomer'0 9 may be taken as representative of its decisionmaking in criminal trials of Negroes.
Toomer was the more remarkable in light of two points. First,
the prosecution was brought against one slave for killing another-proof that in that era the rule of law reached to the
internal affairs of Negro society. The law did not limit itself
to acting when a Negro had injured a white. Second, little substantive doubt of the defendant's guilt existed. The appeal,
nonetheless, succeeded on a nicety which might not have prevailed in a later age. The defendant Negro had been tried in
Christ Church parish, where he had inflicted the fatal wound;
not in Charleston parish where the victim had shortly thereafter
died. The trial rules of Charleston parish required unanimity as
to guilt among the magistrates and freeholders, whereas Christ
Church parish required only a majority. The slave, on appeal,
argued that a 1793 act should be applied to him, and the court
responded generously:
105. Id. at 47.

106. Ex parte Jesse Brown, 2 Bail. 323 (S.C. 1831).
107. 2 Bail. 560 (S.C. 1831).
109. Originally at English common law-and in South Carolina at the time
-burglary required, in addition to breaking and entering, that it be done at
night and in a residence.
109. 1 Cheves 106 (S.C. 1840).
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The act of 1793, was passed for the purpose of settling
a doubtful question on an important subject. The terms
are very general, and, perhaps, were not intended, at
the time, to embrace the homicide of one slave by another. At least, considering the policy of the country,
then, in regard to slaves, it may well be doubted
whether such cases were contemplated at the time the
Act was passed. Yet the terms are so broad and comprehensive, that they do, literally, embrace all cases of
homicide. But the tendency of our modern legislation
has been such as to promote a more favorable regard
for the life of the slave, and we think the presiding
Judge below was right in ordering the prohibition. The
last clause of the Act, on a fair and liberal construction, applies as well to the trial of slaves as of white
persons." 0
It would be possible to ascribe the impartiality of results in
trials of slaves solely to solicitousness for the property interests
of masters were it not for two additional phenomena. The first
was the fair-minded disposition of prosecutions of whites for
injuries to free Negroes."' To be sure, the court was not arguing
that free Negroes should be treated on a dead-level plane with
whites. Thus, O'Neall observed: "Free negroes belong to a dein no respect, on a perfect
graded caste of society; they are,
2
equality with the white man.""1

Yet at that time, in the second quarter of the nineteenth century,
throughout the United States the essential question about racial
relations was not, should Negroes be treated as fully integrated
members of American society? After all, a generation later
Abraham Lincoln was to doubt the Negroes' inherent capacities
for living in equality with whites, while Ohio, Indiana, and
Illinois were barring free Negroes from settling within their
territory. The question was, rather, how unequal were Negroes
to be ?1 3 Once the question is thus properly phrased in terms of
the time and culture, O'Neall's statement must rank as significant.
110. Id. at 107-08.
111. See State v. Hill, 2 Speers 150 (S.C. 1843) ; State v. Harden, 2 Speers

152 n (S.C. 1832).
112. State v. Harden, 2 Speers 152 n, 155 n (S.C. 1832).

113. L. LiTWACK,

NORTH OF SLAvERY

(1961).
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The unlawfulness of an assault and battery upon a free
negro, without reasonable provocation, cannot be
doubted. For to no white man does the right belong of
correcting, at pleasure, a free negro. The peace of
society is as much broken by an assault and battery
114
upon him, as it is upon a white man.
Far from demonstrating after 1830 a callous disregard for the
free Negroes' condition in the wake of mounting anger at
Yankee abolitionism, the judges continued a protective tradition
which reached back before the creation of the 1824 court to the
less troubled days of the early nineteenth century and is best
exemplified by the words of David Johnson when still a circuit
judge. Denying an appeal by a white who had been stopped
while attempting to kidnap a free Negro boy and sell him into
slavery, Johnson admitted that the writ under which he had
been apprehended was irregular since it had been issued by a
local commissioner of the poor who apparently simply devised
it out of whole cloth. Johnson rebuffed the white kidnapper's
objections to the writ's illegality by fiat: "[Ilt is not necessary
to consider, as it . . . subserved the cause of justice and humanity ...
."115 That-the cause of justice and humanityseems to have been the judges' dominant concern.
This impression is strengthened by an examination of prosecutions of whites for attacks upon slaves. As we have already
noted, the fact that only two of the sixteen appellants succeeded
is in itself suggestive. And the suggestion is strengthened by the
circumstance that one of the two had clearly been subjected to
double jeopardy,". 6 while the other had never been furnished
with a copy of his indictment. 1 7
State v. Winningham, the latter case, produced O'Neall's only
dissent in this area. Yet its foundation, in O'Neall's belief that
the defendants were "plainly guilty of the most atrocious murder, ever committed in the State,"" 8 and his consequent desire to
114. State v. Harden, 2 Speers 152 n, 154 n (S.C. 1832).
115. Welborn v. Little, 1 Nott & McC. 263, 264 (S.C. 1818). See also the
following instances of prosecutions of whites for injury to free Negroes: State
v. Wilson, 2 Mill's Const. 135 (S.C. 1818); State v. Greenwood, 1 Mill's
Const 420 (S.C. 1817) (the state was prosecuting a policeman); Pepoon v.

Clarke, 1 Mill's Const. 137 (S.C. 1817).

116. State v. McKee, 1 Bail. 651 (S.C. 1830).

117. State v. Winningham, 10 Rich. 257 (S.C. 1857).
118. Id. at 270.
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hold that they had waived their right to demand such a copy, is
better testimony to O'Neall's proclivity for justice of the heart
than for any hypothesis that the majority was straying from
neutrality in order to excuse a white murderer of a slave. Furthermore, there were numerous instances in which they could
have indulged such inclinations yet did not-as when confronted
by objections to the vagueness of a statute prohibiting cruel
punishment of slaves and to the introduction at trial of evidence
obtained only as the fruit of an induced confession. 11 9
Finally, we should note two possible objections to the interpretation offered here. One-that the judges acted only in the
extreme cases of homicide-is untenable in light of convictions
upheld for pistol-whipping a slave, for punishing a slave with
two hundred strokes of an India rubber whip, and for failing
to renew slaves' clothing for seventeen months. 120 The other
objection would suggest again the dominance of property
motives. The master, on this showing, had an interest in the
state's prosecuting whites who harmed his chattel property.
Certainly, he frequently did. But what of the occasions when
the state acted against the master himself for an injury to his
own slave? What of State v. Bowen in which the master was
found guilty of poor treatment of his property?. And finally,
what of state prosecutions of the master for murdering his own
slave? 121 There he did not have much of an interest in prosecution at all. On balance, one is well-nigh forced to conclude that
the South Carolina court's record in protecting slaves and free
Negroes was marked by a persistent demand that the lower
castes-though lower-be accorded, not "equal protection" but,
and still remarkable, what may be best summed up as "due
protection and ordered process."
VI. MAN UISSION AND

Comrry: O'NALL

vERsus THE

CONSERVATIVE CHANCELLORS

The structural changes of 1835 and 1836 had potentially
limited the scope of O'Neall's influence in manumission cases.
119. See State v. Motley, 7 Rich. 327 (S.C. 1854); State v. Wilson, 1
Cheves 163 (S.C. 1840).
120. See, e.g., State v. Harlan, 5 Rich. 470 (S.C. 1852); State v. Bowen, 3
Strob. 573 (S.C. 1849); State v. Wilson, 1 Cheves 163 (S.C. 1840).
121. See, e.g., State v. Bradley, 9 Rich. 168 (S.C. 1855). Such instances
were admittedly rare in South Carolina. Yet the four prosecutions fit into an
overall pattern of southern justice in which over one-third of all prosecutions
of this sort were brought against masters.
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He had no voice in equity decisions unless they went beyond the
Equity Appeals Bench to the combined court. After Carmille
and the 1841 Act, potential became actual. In two important
respects conservative chancellors were able to carve out a more
pro-slavery line than O'Neall liked.
The first was their abandoning of O'NealI's strictly prospective interpretation of the 181 Act. In July 1844 the highly
eccentric, pro-slavery but unionist Chancellor Job Johnstone122
seized the first opportunity to question the latitudinarian doctrines of his former law partner, John Belton O'Neall. Gordon
V. Blackman' 23 involved a will whose probate had begun in
1839, but whose provisions had not been carried out by the time
the 1841 Act was passed. The will directed the executors to
apply for a special legislative grant of in-state freedom, or that
failing, to send those Negroes who wished to a free state or
Liberia. Johnstone viewed the will as
another of those cases, multiplying of late, with a fearful rapidity, in which the superstitious weakness of
dying men, proceeding from an astonishing ignorance
of the solid moral and scriptural foundations . . . of
slavery . . .and from a total inattention to the shock

which their conduct is calculated to give to the whole
frame of our social polity, induces them, in their last
moments, to emancipate their slaves in fraud of the
indubitable and declared policy of the State.1 2 4

His repugnance to the bequest was stronger than he could
express, yet he felt too "bound by one or two decisions .. .to
declare it void."'1 25 Frazier "hedged in on all sides" ;126 and

while he saw a clear factual distinction between Carmille's deed
and Gordon's bequest, O'Neall's hyperactivism in Carmille
barred him: The "opinion delivered in that case [was] . . .so

sweeping"' 2 7 as to leave no precedential room to draw a distinction on circuit. Therefore he sent the case upstairs.
122. Cf. 2 PtRRY 134. In early life he was a doctor. When a judge, he once
knocked down a man who innocently addressed him by the former title, disliked circuit riding because of bedbugs of which "[n]o one ever had a greater
horror," (Id. at 132) and had positively Hobbesian fear that he would be
thrown from his mount and trampled underfoot by the horses of lawyers
accompanying him 1

123. 1 Rich. Eq. 61 (S.C. 1844).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 64.

126. Id.
127. Id.
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Once before the chancellors, O'Neall's limitation of the Act to
post-1841 bequests fell unceremoniously to the ground. Chancellor Harper, with Johnstone and Dunkin concurring, ruled the
Negroes firmly into slavery. Frazierno longer applied since the
1841 law had intervened. Nor could objections avail that the
Act thus construed violated constitutional prohibitions against
impairing the obligation of contracts and passing ex post facto
laws. Even under Frazier, Harper declared, the Negroes belonged to the executor as slaves; therefore they could not contract, and could not have raised that issue. Consequently, these
slaves had no status to raise an ex post facto claim. As for the
executor's interest, the law would have been unconstitutionally
retroactive, had he already sent them out-of-state and had the
law been read to allow the residuary legatees compensation for
the slaves. But that was not relevant here when the executor
simply stood "in the place of the testator."' 2 8 The law was no
more retrospective "than if the testator himself had expressed an
intention of liberating ... and before his execution ... an act
of the legislature had forbidden it."' 29 Thus Harper demolished

Frazier and Carmille as guides for the equity court in all cases
of pending wills and unexecuted deeds, and expanded the 1841
Act to the dimensions that the legislature probably intended.
Though the chancellors continued reluctantly to uphold
grants to freedom effectuated before 1841,130 they held fast to
the restrictive doctrine of Gordo 31 while broadening the range
of their jurisprudential potshots to include disapproval of Car3 2 The court also attacked the other
mille in addition to Frazier.1
road which O'Neal had opened-in-state quasi-freedom. In
Johnson v. Olarkson Chancellor Dunkin found an almost invisible difference from Rluzme. Rhame had enabled the executor
to take slaves and property because the testator had merely
advised him to allow quasi-freedom and let the slaves use the
property. Johnson made in-state freedom or removal and the
128. Blackman's Ex'r v. Gordon, 2 Rich. Eq. 43, 44 (S.C. 1845), dismissing
appeal from Gordon v. Blackman's Ex'r, 1 Rich. Eq. 61 (S.C. 1844).
129. Id.
130. See Broughton v. Teffer, 3 Rich. Eq. 431 (S.C. 1851).
131. See Johnson v. Clarkson, 3 Rich. Eq. 305 (S.C. 1851); Finley v.

Hunter, 2 Strob. Eq. 208 (S.C. 1848).
132. Finley v. Hunter, 2 Strob. Eq. 208 (S.C. 1848). Johnstone refers to
Fracier as a case "by which I am bound, however much I doubt its correctness." Id. at 214.
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Negroes' use of the property a condition of the bequest. Therefore Clarkson's executor could not take.13 3
Their final gambit was an assault on property bequests to
Negroes which, though technically correct in its earlier stages
of voiding gifts to slaves,' 3 4 reached on the eve of the Civil War
a disregard for interstate comity equalled only by the Georgia
court and the post-1859 Mississippi court.
In WiZlis v. Jolliffe 35 the chancellors failed to snatch back
into slavery a group of Negroes who had reached the soil of
Ohio in the nick of time. Their master, a chronic alcoholic whose
visions of black avenging angels had apparently caused him to
take them to free territory, had died a few minutes after crossing the Ohio River, and his intent freed them irrevocably. But
he had also left them a bequest of property in his will, which
the chancellors refused to turn over on the grounds that the will
was contrary to the policy of the state. Chancellor Francis H.
Wardlaw wrote an opinion justifying the refusal on the theory
that the Negroes would have still been slaves in South Carolina
and could not have taken bequests there.
When the Negroes' case reached the new three-man supreme
court, O'Neall secured one final victory. Writing for Job Johnstone and himself, O'Neall declared that the Negroes were
entitled.
[I] should feel myself degraded if, like some in Ohio
and other abolition States, I trampled on law and Constitution, in obedience to popular will. 3 6
Giving the Negroes the property might well, O'Neall implied,
run against South Carolina popular sentiment. But that was
no excuse for Wardlaw's behavior. The record might show that
133. However Dargerfield's will was worded as a "condition." I find the
difference hard to see. But see McLeish v. Burch, 3 Strob. Eq. 225 (S.C.
1849) (seemingly closer to Dangerfield). Quaere: Did two Chancellors change
their mind between 1849 and 1851? Or was it that the question of freedom was
moot since the executor had already disregarded the "advice" and sold the
slaves, and the issue was merely whether he had to pay the residuary heirs?
Or that McLeish was heard by the combined court with O'Neall present? The
justices split in McLeish, 6-2. Pro the executor and pro the alleged trusts:
O'Neall, Richardson, Evans, Frost, JJ., Caldwell, Dunkdn, CC. Anti: David
Wardlaw, J., Dargan, C. Absent, Withers, J.
134. See Mallet v. Smith, 6 Rich. Eq. 12 (S.C. 1853); Thorne v. Fordham,
4 Rich. Eq. 223 (S.C. 1852); Swinton v. Egleston, 3 Rich. Eq. 201 (S.C.
1851). But O'Neall personally disapproved of this view.

135. 11 Rich. Eq. 447 (S.C. 1860).
136. Id. at 516.
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Willis had lived in concubinage with one of the slaves whom he
had freed and that the others were their mutual half-breed children. But that did not allow the justices to write their moral
disapproval of miscegenation into the law when there was "no
law in South Carolina which . . .declare[d] that the trusts in

their favor [were] void.'

18 7

Indubitably, they were free.

VII. CROSSING THE COLOR BAR

While O'Neall's decision making in manumission suits sometimes suggested that more than property rights and a unionist
insistence on comity were at stake-as in his pained dissent
when no other judge would consent to presume the passage of
a special legislative act freeing a slave' 3 8-the presence of other
motives was more apparent in his treatment of free persons who
claimed to be whites and thus exempt from the Free Colored
Persons' Headtax. Arguably, he was less isolated here, for most
of his brethren displayed some tendencies to "level up." In one
instance, the venerable Bay had barred the tax collector from
collecting on the somewhat amazing grounds that the plaintiff's
darkish complexion was adequately explained by his claim to be
a North Carolinian of Egyptian ancestry, notwithstanding his
thoroughly Anglo-Saxon name, "Miller."' 3 9 In another case,
O'Neall persuaded all but one of his colleagues that the failure
of one of three plaintiffs who were brothers to appear in court
should not vitiate a lower court jury finding that they were all
whites. 1,0 O'Neall stressed the impartiality of the jury finding,
but ignored ample lower court testimony that the plaintiffs had
Negro blood in them, had been regarded by many whites in
their community as "colored," and particularly that the absent
brother was of considerably darker complexion than the two
137. Id.

138. In Vinyard v. Passalaigue, 2 Strob. 536 (S.C. 1845) despite absence of
proof which should have been relatively easy to come by had it existed,
O'Neall argued vehemently for allowing "good slaves" to become resident free
Negroes. "The first thing which ought to be done, is to get back alongside of
such men as C.J. Rutledge . . . in the case of the Guardian of Sally v.
Beatley [sic] . . . ." Id. at 549. Rutledge's was "an expression of the benevolent feelings which had been tried in the crucible of the revolution." Id. Changing his legal assessment of Sally from the days of Carmille-when he had
found it to contain enough right for his instant purpose-O'Neall stated, "there
was perhaps no very correct notion of law in the ruling of the case, yet it
spoke what, I think, always belongs to Carolina-a love of mercy, of right,
and a hatred of that which is mean or oppressive." Id.
139. Johnson v. Basquere, 1 Speers 329 (S.C. 1843).
140. Johnson v. Boon, 1 Speers 268 (S.C. 1843). Andrew Pickens Butler,
later Senator, thought the appearance of all indispensable. Id. at 271.
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who showed up. He also ignored his own instructions to the jury
at the first trial.
I said to the jury, that when men had been acknowledged as white men, and allowed all their privileges,
it was bad policy to degrade them to the condition of
free negroes.

141

Granted that their association with whites, though generally
permitted, had been "never without question" 142 and that the

attempt of one to vote had been negated by the election official,
these instructions were hardly unbiased. O'Neall seemed impressed by their respectable character (their father had been a
Methodist preacher) and inclined to give them the benefit of
the doubt.
Three years later O'Neall tried unsuccessfully to give greater
benefits. In WhiTe & Bass v. Tax Collector1 43 some grandchildren of a "well known and much respected mulatto woman
about Camden" 144 had been declared white by one jury, while

others had been declared mulatto by another jury. O'Neall's
report of their circuit trial to the court made his personal feelings clear:
I wish the court may be able to find some ground to
give a new trial. For if any people tinged with African
blood are worthy to be rated as white, the relatrix and
45
relators present the very best claim to be so rated.
But the grounds were virtually non-existent, and O'Neall's wish
failed by three to two. Judge Edward Frost wrote the majority
opinion denying a new trial, and observing: "The constant
tendency of this class to assimilate to the white, and the desire
of elevation, present frequent cases of embarrassment and difficulty."146

VIII. Tnn PnooF

oF TuE PUDDnTG: O'NrAl's

"SUBVERSIVE PAMP

eT"

Pursuant to a resolution of the state agricultural society,
O'Neall produced what is probably the most remarkable document on slavery written by a deep southerner during the 15
141. Id. at 270.

142. Id. at 269.

143.
144.
145.
146.

3 Rich. 136 (S.C. 1846).
Id.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 139.
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years before Fort Sumter. His Digest1 4 was considerably more
than a mere collection of existing laws. It was a policy document recommending far-going liberalization of the South Carolina Slave Code-a fact which the Senate Judiciary Committee,
noted with distaste when it was referred to them by Governor
Johnson. In late December, 1848, that committee, headed by a
nephew of Chancellor DeSaussure, reported back to the Senate
floor "their belief that as a compilation of law, it is valuable ....

But the incorporation of private opinions, however high the
source from which they emanate, may tend to lead the unskilled
into error.'14

Senator Wilmot DeSaussure and his colleagues

were insistent that the work should not be published at the
expense of the State, since in many particulars, it contained
opinions at variance with the settled policy of the State. Behind
their insistence lay a vastly different view of proper slave policy
-a fact which became evident in the ensuing battle of words
between two Columbia papers, the Telegraph, which adopted the
committee's view, and the official organ of the South Carolina
Temperance Society, which vehemently supported O'Neall's.
O'Neall got off to a quick start by trying to impose his own
views on the law of presumptions arising from color. In the first
chapter he argued that "[wihen the [Negro] blood is reduced to,
or below 1/, the jury ought always to find the party white."'1 19
He then argued that in the Colored Tax cases the burden of
proof ought always to lie on the tax collector. To both of these
assertions the committee objected, noting that the case in question did not settle the first point and that O'Neall's proposal
about the tax collector amounted to reversing the "general rule
*

.

.that the onus of proof rests upon such as claim a higher

status or color."' 5 0 The judiciary committee liked his next suggestion even less. O'Neall urged that the term "white man" in
the state constitution's suffrage provisions meant only to
distinguish Negroes from whites and that consequently a case
barring Indians from voting or holding office should be re147. J.

O'NEALL, DIGEST OF THE NEGRO LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA

[hereinafter cited as O'NEAI., DIGEST].
148. Columbia Telegraph, Dec. 25, 1848 (Columbia, South Carolina).

(1848)

149. O'NEALL, DIGEST, ch. I, § 8.
150. Columbia Telegraph, Dec. 25, 1848 [hereinafter cited as 1st Telegraph;

while the Telegraph's Jan. 6, 1849, "rebuttal" to the Temperence Advocate is
cited as 2nd Telegraph]. The Advocate article appeared (according to the
Telegraph) the previous Thursday [hereinafter cited as Advocate].
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versed. 151 Wilmot's committee disagreed for two reasons. First,
the Indian already enjoyed immunity from taxation, and the
"allowance, therefore, of suffrage and holding office would
place him upon a better condition than the whites."1 52 Second,
the well established policy of the State denying the franchise to
free Negroes was
a strong reason why the Indian should be debarred, in
this respect, from an equality with the white man. So
closely does the color of these two races assimilate, that
granting these privileges to one, may effect an entrance
for the other, and lead to a disregard for color, the
observance of which is one of the strong supports of the
1 2
[peculiar] institution. 5 a
Following his proposal for political equality between Indian
and white, O'Neall made explicit the views which had underlain
his manumission decisions from Sylvester to Vinyard. He began
by arguing that the law of 1820 had "done harm instead of
good."r 5 3 It had produced "evasions without number" which
succeeded "by vesting ownership in persons legally capable ...
and thus substantially conferring freedom, when it was legally
denied."'1 54 Though marginally citing Cline, Singletary, Rhame,
and Carmille,O'Neall failed to note that only they had made the
evasions "legally" successful. Then he confronted the legislature
point blank.
My experience as a man, and a Judge, leads me to condenm the Acts of 1820 and 1841. They ought to be
repealed and the Act of 1800 restored. The State has
nothing to fear from emancipation, regulated as that
law directs it to be. 155
O'Neall believed that a master ought to have power to free
faithful slaves, for freedom was the only reward which both
appreciated and "in a slave country, the good should be especially rewarded."' 5 Urging that the peculiar institution would
be strengthened against abolitionists if the legislature heeded
his advice, he warned that "unjust laws, or unmerciful manage151. State ex rel. John Marsh v. Managers of Elections for York District,

1 Bail. 215 (S.C. 1829); cf. O'NEALL, DiGEsT, ch. 1, § 19.

152. 1st Telegraph.
152a. Id.

153. O'N-ALL, DIGEST, ch. I, § 37.
154. Id.
155. Id. ch. I, § 44.

156. Id.
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ment of slaves, fall upon us, and our institutions, with more
withering effect than anything else.

1 57

He concluded: "I would

see South Carolina, the kind mother and mistress of all her
people, free and slave. To all extending justice and mercy."' 5"
According to the Temperance Advocate, O'Neall's reading of
these words at a Spartanburg meeting of the State Agricultural
Society was received with a rapturous burst of applause. The
judiciary committee, however, had different feelings about
increasing the number of free Negroes living in South Carolina.
The creation of a class differing by no distinctive
color ...

from the servile class ...

cannot fail to pro-

duce in the lower caste envy and heart-burning, the
result of which may be most disastrous. 59
Even if servile insurrection did not ensue, "[t]he indolent character of the race, and their indisposition to labor, when livelihood can be obtained by other means, would have a tendency
to create a class seriously prejudicial to the interests and morality of the country." o0
In addition to making it easier for slaves to become free
Negroes and for light coloreds to assimilate to whites, O'Neall
urged vast increases in the legal protections cloaking them in
their respective stations. To begin with he wished to remove
what he regarded as absurdities imposed by the 1*740 Slave Code
such as restrictions on slaves' clothing,' 6 ' playing of trumpets
163
and partying, 0

2

and on their use of the public highways.

He "further proposed three fundamental reforms in slave life.
First, he wanted a substantial reduction in the maximum-hours
law which permitted masters to demand 15 hours work per day
during the summer and 14 during the winter. O'Neall argued
that the maximum should be reduced, respectively, to 12 and 10
hours. Second, he felt that the "maltreatment" statute was much
too mild and that the provision allowing the master to exculpate
himself by oath should be removed. He regretted "to say, that
there was in such a State as ours, great occasion for the enforcement of such a law, accompanied by severe penalties," 64 and
157. Id.

158. Id.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

1st Telegraph.
Id.
O'NrALL, DIGEST, ch. II, §§ 48-49.
Id. ch. II, §§ 56-57.
Id. ch. II, §§ 51-52.
Id. ch. II, § 26.
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thought that the grand jury of each district should be required
by law at each court term "to enquire of all violations of duty,
on the part of masters . . . and . . .that every one by them

reported, should be ordered instantly to be indicted." 165 Third,
he disapproved of the legal inability of slaves to marry with the
result that offspring of a slave and a free Negro could not
inherit their free parent's property. While O'Neall did not
explicitly advocate legalized marriage between slaves, he seemed
to feel that the legislature ought to rethink the matter, and, at
the very least, pass an act allowing the bastard offspring of
slaves and free Negroes to inherit.
Turning to the protection of free Negroes, O'Neall became
more explicit about interracial marriage. While, according to
the Advocate, he deplored "such marriages as much as any other
man," he argued that precedent proved them legal. With this,
as with his assertion about maltreatment of slaves, the committee took strong issue. Wilmot DeSaussure and his colleagues
accused O'Neall of misusing precedent in regard to interracial
marriage by trying to give his special concurrence, in the relevant case,166 the weight of the majority opinion which had
decided the case on a narrower ground and not considered the
issue. Whatever the legal merits of the dispute, the Telegraph
said, echoing the committee's views, "the policy of the State is
decidedly against it. Whatever tends to break down the barriers
between the two classes of color, must weaken the institution." 167
Hardly less pernicious was O'Neall's slight upon masters' treatment of slaves:
The Committee expresses a decided dissent to the charge
• . .that negroes in South Carolina are so badly provided with clothing, food, etc., as to need the enforcement of the existing statutory enactments by severe
penalties. As a peasantry, their provision is more ample
than in any other part of the world except the slaveholding States ....
The exceptions, if any exist, must
be very rare.368

165. Id.
166. Bowers v. Newman, 2 McMul. 472 (S.C. 1842). The committee seems
to have had the better of the argument, notwithstanding the Advocate's attempt to support O'Neall on the issue.
167. 1st Telegraph.
168. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1969

41

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1969], Art. 2
SOUTH CAROLixA LAW R.viEw[

[Vol. 21

O'Neall was equally unhappy with two statutes which placed
the free Negro below the white. The provision for sale of free
Negroes unable to pay their capitation tax was, he thought, of
"exceedingly questionable"'169 constitutionality. So, too, was the
law forbidding them to return to the state if they journeyed
north of Washington, D.C. He saw no necessity for restricting
the free Negro's right to travel and consequently was disposed
to repeal it. Behind his recommendations lay a view of the free
Negro's rightful position in society which was anathema to the
committee. For O'Neall, the free Negro might well be naturally
inferior to the white. Nonetheless, he was embraced in South
Carolina's "Social Contract" at least to the extent of having a
right to the basic immunities from arbitrary governmental
power (if not all the positive privileges such as voting). The
committee, opposed to all measures which would diminish the
barriers between the two races, saw nothing unconstitutional
Constiabout the statutes since the "term 'freeman' used in the
17 0
tution, [did] not . .. apply to free persons of color.'

On that ground too, the members opposed O'Neall's insistence
that free Negroes had a right to habeas corpus171-though here
they stood on weaker ground than usual since the specific removal of the right in the anti-immigration statute implied that
Negroes enjoyed it as a general rule. On this and one other
ground-their view that Negroes were naturally lazy liars-they
opposed most of O'Neall's major suggestions for reform in the
Black Criminal Code. True, they did not explicitly reject
O'Neall's assessment of trial by magistrates and freeholders as
"the worst system which could be devised,"'1 72 or his insistence
that the slave's right of appeal was too limited. But, they
notably failed to except from their general condemnation of his
Digest, or to adopt, the solutions he urged: trial by a 12-man
jury, the right to ten peremptory challenges of the 24-man
panel, a court-appointed counsel, and extension of the right to
appeal from capital to all non-capital cases.' 7 3 And they explicitly repudiated O'Neall's proposal that slaves and free Negroes should be examined under oath in court. O'Neall believed:
169. O'NEALL,
170.
171.
172.
173.

DIGEST,

ch. I, § 55.

1st Telegraph.
O'NEALL, DIGEST, ci. I,
Id. ch. III, § 32.
Id. ch. III, §§ 31-32.

§ 48.
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Negroes, (slaves or free) will feel the sanctions of an
oath, with as much force as any of the ignorant classes
of white people, in a Christian country ....
The
course pursued on the trial of negroes, in the adduction
and obtaining testimony, leads to none of the certainties
of truth. Falsehood is often the result, and innocence is
17 4
thus often sacrificed on the shrine of prejudice.'
The committee differed sharply. Ignoring ONeall's equation
of poor whites and Negroes, it observed:
The obligation of an oath is too great to be administered to a class so illiterate as to be unable to understand its nature, and whose proverbial mendacity would
generally lead to its violation.' 7 5
O'Neall may have seen some merit in the committee's point
about illiteracy for he offered a solution: teach slaves to read
and write. The prohibitory Act of 1834 had grown
out of a feverish state of excitement produced by the
impudent meddling of persons out of the slave States
..

.

. That has, however, subsided, and I trust we are

now prepared to act the part of wise, humane, and fearless masters, and that this law, and all of kindred
character, will be repealed. 176
Repeals of the anti-reading act and of the 1820 and 1841
emancipation statutes were two of the six major repeals which
O'Neall urged that would' have radically changed the nature of
South Carolina's peculiar institution-if not, indeed, as the
committee feared, have led to its speedy collapse. 177

One of O'Neall's principal reasons for urging the reading
statute's repeal stood also behind his third proposal-that the
legislature should repeal an 1803 statute requiring the presence
of whites at Negro church services and limiting their hours.
O'Neall insisted that these restrictions were "a reproach upon
us in the mouths of our enemies, in that we do not afford our
slaves that free worship of God, which he demands for all his
people.' 7 8 The committee's weak rejoinder that they were only
enforced in rare instances of necessity did not satisfy him.
174. Id. ch. I, § 52 (emphasis added).
175. 1st Telegraph.
176. O'NEu, DiGEsT, ch. II, §§ 41-42.

177. The causes of the 1834 Act "have by no means abated, but rather
increased." 1st Telegraph.
178. O'Nw.a, DIGEST, ch. IT, § 47.
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They, if ever resorted to, are not for doing good, but to
gratify hatred, malice, cruelty, or tyranny. This was not
intended, and ought to have no countenance or support,
179
in our Statute law.
He frankly found it impossible to justify as a Christian "that a
aZave is not to be permitted to read the Bible.' 8 0 Nor was he
convinced by the committee's argument that the rapid expansion
of domestic missionaries "within the last few years" 81 provided
an adequate substitute. Although it was the Advocate rather
than ONeall himself which expressly took the most dare-devil
position on the future of slavery itself, the tenor of his argument, his position as president of the Temperance Society, and
his obvious connivance in the Advocate's rebuttal to the Telegraph, make it unlikely that the editor's views diverged from
his. The Advocate urged that it would be a libel on the very
name of Christian to say that forbidding slaves to read was
justifiable while paying "[t]ens of Thousands to have Asiatics,
and the inhabitants of the distant isles of the sea, taught to read
the Scriptures."'' 8 2 Having "beseech[ed] Christians of every sect
to look to this," the Advocate insisted: "If we cannot reconcile
slavery with the Bible, where can we go? If the religious instruction of the slave, including, of course, his reading of the
word of God, be incompatible with slavery itself, how can Christians defend it?"'18

For the Deep South of the late 1840's this was remarkable
ground to take-not, of course, for its writer's belief in the
scriptural foundations of slavery, but rather for his explicit
ordering of contingencies. Here "ideology" did rather more than
rationalize; here it threatened to determine the social scheme of
things. To the committee's alarm O'Neall counterposed three
reassurances whose compatibility was at best skin-deep. First,
the "best slaves in the State, are those who can and do read
Scriptures,"' 8 4 which seemed to imply flatly that the committee's viewpoint was empirically wrong. But second, immediately
before saying this O'Neall had used a very peculiar choice of
words: "It is in vain to say there is danger in":5 permitting
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id. ch. II, § 42.
1st Telegraph.
Advocate.
Advocate.
O'NEAiL, DIGEST, ch. II, § 42.
Id.
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slaves to read. Significantly unclear is whether it is vain because
it is not "Christian" or because it is empirically wrong. The
ordering of words seems initially to suggest the latter. But the
assertion that the best slaves are Bible readers is followed by a
third rationale which runs counter to it. "Such laws look to me
as rather cowardly. It seems as if we are afraid of our slaves.
Such a feeling is unworthy of a Carolina master." 8 6 At the last
O'Neall appealed to Southern chivalry.
O'Neall's peculiar view of the peculiar institution led him to
argue for a fourth change-reducing slave stealing and enticing
slaves to escape, to non-capital offenses. For this the committee
took him to task, arguing that "recent events have demonstrated
that fanaticism will go to such extreme lengths as to need laws
of a most penal character, for self-defense."'8 7 Unabashed,
O'Neall requested the Advocate "to say that he [had] no apology
to make for such sentiments. With two exceptions, (murder and
rape) he would, if he could, abolish every capital punishment in
the State, and substitute punishment in a penitentiary.""'
O'Neall's final two suggestions were no less contrary to the
committee's views of sensible policy. With an optimism that the
committee did not share, O'Neall argued that most slaves taken
to the North would not be contaminated by abolitionist ideas.
Most, he predicted, would "return to their Southern homes, better slaves." 8 9 With the rest, he would take his chances. Not so
said the committee, whose response to his final proposal was
frigid indeed. Having argued for returning to a more permissive manumission structure by repealing the 1820 and 1841 Acts,
in a way that evidently would have allowed freed slaves to
remain in the state, O'Neall wound up by proposing that the
gates of South Carolina be re-opened to incoming free Negroes,
as -well as to South Carolina Negroes who visited at the North.
Advocating repeal of the 1835 successor to the Colored Seaman's
Act which William Johnson had suggested was unconstitutional
twenty-five years earlier, O'Neall stated:
"The first, second, third, and fifth sections of the Act
of 1835, are to my mind, of so questionable policy, that
I should be disposed to repeal them. They carry with
186. Id.
187. 1st Telegraph.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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them so many elements of discord with our sister,
States, and foreign nations, that, unless they were of
paramount necessity, which I have never believed, we
should at once strike them out. I am afraid too, there
are many grave constitutional objections to them, in
whole or in part."' g0
Section 1 barred out-of-State Negroes from settling in South
Carolina, and section 5 prevented South Carolina Negroes from
returning. Sections 2 and 3 provided for imprisonment and
fining of colored seamen. A prudent regard for comity might
have led O'Neall to advocate repeal of sections 2 and 3, but his
suggestions about the first and fifth sections must have stemmed
from something more-from, probably, a view that free Negroes
had certain basic rights under the Federal Constitution. And
that view was, it should be strongly stressed, more liberal than
not only the United States Supreme Court in the Dred Scott
case, but also the legislatures and courts of the old Northwest
Territory States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois which either
barred free Negro settlement altogether or made it contingent
upon deposit of a large sum of money for a privilege which
white persons received free. It is in that comparative light that
we must assess O'Neall's liberalism, and, I believe, conclude that
for its time and place, it was substantial-if not what the committee thought, ridiculous and extreme.
The policy of the State in excluding from its limits by
stringent laws, Free Negroes and persons of color, coming from other places, is so firmly established and their
wisdom so generally conceded, that no reasoning is
needed on the part of the Committee for differing in
opinion from the author in chap. 1, sec. 65.191
On balance, it is hard not to agree from the standpoint of "preservation of slavery" and white supremacy if not from that of
"morality," with the Telegrapl&s second editorial:
(O'Neall's) . . . philanthropy in this instance may be
productive of untold evils, if the circulation of this
book is to produce upon all the effect which it was
wrought upon our neighbor, who not only justifies but
commends suggestions which would put the black on a
footing of perfect equality with the white race.
190.

O'NEALL, DIGEST, ch. I,

191. 1st Telegraph.

§ 65.
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Believing all steps which would introduce such a policy
to be equally fatal to the happiness and well-being of
both races, we feel it our duty solemnly to protest
against any and every attempt to take the initiative
towards them, and therefore warn the public against
the adoption of a book which would prove Amalgamation legal !192

The Telegraph might be exaggerating in saying that O'Neall
suggested perfect equality with the white race. However, that
the enactment of his proposals into law would have radically
altered South Carolina's course seems to me a proposition hard
to refute.
IX. EPILOGUE

As soon as news of Lincoln's election reached Charleston,
Secessionists began to rejoice. No longer could the temporizing
Co-operationists force them to the bitter cup of compromise.
The admission of California as a free state, the bootless struggle
over Kansas, Charles Sumner's insolence, the subversive "higher
law" doctrine of William Seward, John Brown's raid at Harper's Ferry, the willful failure of Northern courts to enforce the
Fugitive Slave Law-all these outrages of the past decade might
have been insufficient to goad the dominant faction of South
Carolina politics down the road to independence. But a black
republican in the White House! That would force the hand of
the Co-operationists' leader, James L. Orr, former speaker of
the house. The junior senator, James Chesnut, was willing to
resign his seat in Washington, and his more cautious colleague,
James Henry Hammond, would have to follow suit. The withdrawal of all South Carolinians from federal offices: that
would be the first step. And the second, a convention to sunder
the ties of Union, was already in the offing. Governor William
Gist was eager to ask the legislature to call for such an assembly.
The results would be decisive: Carolina would secede first, and
the gulf states would follow. A Southern nation was imminent.
On a frosty morning late that month two elderly men stood
atop the steps of the courthouse of a small Piedmont countyseat,
Newberry. A crowd of a hundred or so milled around on the
street in front of the building. First the taller man, then the
shorter, spoke. The crowd, respectfully silent for the first few
192. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1969

47

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1969], Art. 2
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvw

[o
[Vol.
21

minutes, began to stir. What the listening Secessionists heard
was not what they liked to hear from two justices of the state
supreme court. They were particularly irritated with the shorter
man's words. John Belton O'Neall might be the chief justice,
the former president of the Greenville & Columbia Railroad,
and a lifelong resident of Newberry, but he had no right to
speak of the virtues of the Federal Union at this point in history. It was too much. Eggs and turnips began to fly through
the air. Chief Justice O'Neall wiped the yolk off his coat and
continued to speak. When he had finished, he walked down the
steps with his fellow judge, Job Johnstone. Johnstone climbed
into a waiting carriage, and the chief justice followed himthough more stiffly for he was nearly seventy years of age.
Taking the reins, he drove the three miles to his winter plantation.
John Belton O'Neall died in 1863-the year in which the tide
of battle shifted, with Gettysburg and the fall of Vicksburg,
against the new nation whose founding O'Neall had vainly
opposed, and the thirty-fourth year of an extraordinary career
upon the bench. Granted its time and place, two aspects of its
extraordinariness-its persistent drives toward the maintenance
of Union and toward the improvement of the Negro's condition
-are now apparent. Yet what of the third characteristic
ascribed to it at the outset of this essay-greatness?
Undeniably, there is something problematic in such an assessment when we are confronted by two obvious facts. First, in
view of the direction which South Carolina affairs took,
O'Neall's career did not terminate in that crudest sign of stature
-conspicuous long-term influence: His decision-making did not
shape the contours of later generations' politics in the grand
fashion of a John Marshall, nor even did the stamp of his decisions mold jurisprudential channels of the future in the narrower fashion of say Chancellor Kent of New York, or Judge
Cooley of Michigan. Second, his decisions do not by and large
display either that remorseless political logic which characterized the writings of the leading antebellum South Carolinian,
John C. Calhoun, or the sheer analytic power of a judge like
Justice Samuel Miller. The day is too long past when we can
sensibly conclude with the fulsome biographical kindnesses so
popular in O'Neall's day.
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Nonetheless I would argue that O'Neall's career, despite its
limited compass, partook of greatness on four counts. First, he
could-once beyond the imagistic foothills exemplified by his
"sturdy republican wanderer" clothed in skins and drinking
from the bubbling brook--chisel out passages of ample logical
power-as his six point rebuttal to Rhett's political theories. His
point about "allegiance" and congressional territories constituted a turn of the analytic knife sufficiently sharp for many a
unionist United States Supreme Court justice not to have been
displeased had he turned it himself. When O'Neall was less persuasive, it was generally because he illustrated in a distinctly
personal way-a characteristic Oliver Wendell Holmes once
rather left-handedly ascribed to his colleague, the elder Harlan.
Harlan, Holmes observed, had a mind like a powerful vice, the
jaws of which could not get closer than two inches apart. The
jaws of O'Neall's mind were usually both gentler and closer
together, as when he was seeking to cajole his colleagues into
allowing bequests of freedom. When fixed apart, they were generally stuck upon a gristly piece of inhumanity which he could
not smoothly digest. And that, I think, suggests a second aspect
of greatness--O'Neall's quintessential humanity. It was almost
always outrage at iniquity which derailed his logic. And that,
again, is perhaps the best way to be derailed. Thirdly, for a
judge with such distaste for politics, O'Neall had a remarkably
acute sense of the politically possible. Shortly after the 1860
Democratic debacle at Charleston, when the party split hopelessly into northern and southern wings, O'Neall indulged in a
striking bit of Jeffersonian agrarianism. Writing to the local
Newberry paper, he stated: "I regard politics as a sorry trade!
I have never found the man whom it warmed, fed, or clothed.
But I know many .

.

. whom it has made naked, cold, and

hungry. Employment and attention to a man's own business is
the best antidote to politics. The honest laborious farmer,
mechanic, or merchant is no politician." 193 Yet, his own manner
of attending to his own business on the court evidenced a wellnigh maximal use of the power available to a single judge operating in a milieu such as South Carolina of his day. True, his
decisions had twice been rebuked by the legislature. Nonetheless,
his tactical mistakes-if such they were--did not add up to a
193. H. ScHuRz, NATIONALISM AND SECTIONALISM IN SOUTH CAROLINA,
1852-1860, at 6 (1950) (quoting from a letter to the Newberry Conservatist,
July 10, 1860).
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strategic debacle. O'Neall had a curious capacity to surface once
more to wield judicial power. Fourth and finally, one must say
something about his sense of the larger political realities of
nineteenth century America's evolution. Robert Barnwell Rhett
won in the short-run. Indeed, O'Neall was in no position-either
by himself or in company with the minority band of unionists
-to prevent South Carolina from trying Rhett's secessionist
solution to the vexing problems confronting a slave society
increasingly encircled by freer politics. O'Neall lived long
enough to see dashed hopes which he had expressed just six
weeks before Lincoln's election to his friend, Senator James
Henry Hammond: "I hope that South Carolina never will be
represented, or rather misrepresented, by Rhett, or any of his
bullying set."'1 94 Yet, looking back a century, whose policies
appear more expedient? Rhett's plan to cut bait, or O'Neall's to
continue fishing in Union waters? In retrospect, what is remarkable about the War Between the States is not that the
South ultimately lost, but rather that the contest was so close.
O'Neall may or may not have been intellectually sound in declaring to Hammond: "I regard Secession, as Revolution,
exactly equal to that in '76". 19 5 And he may or may not have
been correct in observing-not asking, for he significantly
omitted the question-mark: "Have we any cause for that."' 19 6
Yet, it is hard to dispute that his Burkean sense of continuity
and gradualism led him correctly to the belief that South Carolina's long-term influence and prosperity-no matter how much
diminished from the halcyon days of the early Republic-would
remain greater by keeping within the Union. The trouble with
Rhett's politics was precisely that its practice did make many
naked, cold, and hungry. O'Neall illustrated far better than most
of his contemporaries another Holmesian adage: "A page of
experience is worth a thousand pages of logic." O'Neall's page
of experience expressed a keen understanding of the art of the
possible.

194. Letter, entry 24481 and 24482, in the James Henry Hammond Collection, Library of Congress.
195. Id.

196. Id.
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